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ABSTRACT 
 In the last decade, China and India have risen to prominence in the Indo-Pacific 
region, requiring U.S. policymakers, subject matter experts, and military officials to shift 
their attention toward understanding this critical relationship. The maintenance and 
stability of the Indo-Pacific region depend on the dynamics of the Sino-Indian 
relationship. Thus, a better understanding of Sino-Indian relations can have significant 
implications for how the U.S. strategy progresses in the Indo-Pacific region. First, to 
understand the 21st-century Sino-Indian relationship, this thesis analyzed the factors that 
led to cooperation and discord between China and India during the 1950s and early 
1960s, which culminated in the 1962 border war. Second, the thesis analyzed Sino-Indian 
relations from 2008–2017, identifying whether factors from the 1950s and early 1960s 
apply to current and future Sino-Indian relations. Despite the nuances that mark both 
periods, the 21st-century Sino-Indian relationship has followed a similar path of 
cooperation, competition, and conflict, which culminated in the 2017 Doklam 
standoff—the longest border standoff since the 1962 border war. Overall, across both 
periods, this thesis found that unresolved territorial disputes, competition for energy 
resources, a race for regional influence, and assertive leadership have hindered 
cooperation. Extrapolating from the research, these factors will likely continue, creating a 
rocky way ahead for the Indo-Pacific region. 
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1 
I. SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: A TALE OF TWO ASIAN 
GIANTS 
China and India established their governments following World War II, with a 
desire to restore national identity and grow their economies and militaries. Both countries 
were significantly affected by Western imperialism, which sought to take advantage of 
China’s and India’s vast natural resources and human capital. Upon establishing 
themselves as new nation-states, China and India became forerunners of many subsequent 
independence movements, effectively leading to a new era of nation-and state-building. 
However, competition and conflict arose between them and culminated in the 1962 Border 
War, destroying their efforts to build cooperation. Today, the developing economic and 
military capabilities of both China and India, who cooperate in some areas but conflict in 
others, have brought emphasis to the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, this thesis assesses 
the factors that led to cooperation and discord between China and India during the 1950s 
and early 1960s and what historical legacies portend to current and future Sino-Indian 
relations. Ultimately, what factors undermined Sino-Indian cooperation between 1950 and 
1962 and are the same factors weakening Sino-Indian cooperation in the last decade? 
Early Sino-Indian relations were best characterized as cooperative, founded on 
similar struggles for independence. China and India established common ground after 
creating of their official governments, commencing diplomatic relations in the spring of 
1950. Political representatives at all levels exchanged visits between countries to expand 
their awareness and knowledge in the hope of developing their massive populations and 
ailing economies as well as creating a lasting cooperative relationship. In 1954, the Sino-
Indian relationship reached its apex with the Panchsheel (the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence) agreement, which largely characterized their relationship. These principles 
consist of “(1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) 
mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) 
equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.”1 In light of the 
                                                 
1 Gillian Hui Lynn Goh, “China and India: Towards Greater Cooperation and Exchange,” China: An 
International Journal 4, no. 2 (2006): 266, https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2006.0013. 
2 
bipolar world, India and China continued to work together and desired to establish a united 
front comprised of newly independent states to increase diplomatic and economic 
opportunities. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, ideological differences and 
territorial disagreements along their shared border resulted in intense competition. Both 
sides disagreed on the perceived line of demarcation, which separated Tibet from India, 
causing discord between China and India and exacerbating misperceptions regarding their 
shared border. Thus, in 1962, China and India engaged in a border war that completely 
severed the relationship. 
Contemporary Sino-Indian relations continue to reflect seeds from the past—a mix 
of cooperation and competition best characterizes the 21st century relationship. 
Globalization and the information era have brought the world closer together and created 
new opportunities for Sino-Indian cooperation while also magnifying issues of discord. 
China and India have established confidence-building measures designed to increase 
diplomatic, institutional, cultural, military, and economic transparency in an attempt to 
overcome historical legacies and build a new era of Sino-Indian cooperation. Economic 
interdependence and joint-institution building have shaped the current relationship as both 
countries seek to regain their status as great powers. For example, China’s recent creation 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is demonstrative of its attempt to create 
an inclusive regional economic institution that, by extension, builds cooperation with the 
Indians. However, despite working together, bilaterally and multilaterally these two Asian 
giants vie for power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region, igniting competition among 
them; both have top-performing economies, modernizing militaries, and partners in the 
region that fundamentally oppose one another. For example, the most recent border clash 
in the Doklam region—the longest border standoff since the 1962 border clash—reveals 
that deep-seated territorial issues continue to plague efforts to cooperate. In short, modern 
institutions, increased trade, and globalization appear to have complicated the already 
complex historical legacies that destroyed Sino-Indian relations in 1962. 
This study elucidates the causal factors that have led to cooperation and discord 
between China and India from 1950–1962 and 2008–2017. These two time periods 
represent significant historical changes: the introduction of a bipolar world characterizes 
3 
the former, while the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis and what appears to be the 
beginning of China’s assertiveness and the shifting of the global power balance define the 
latter. Arguably, these two states are the most important in the Indo-Pacific region, one 
being the world’s largest socialist state and the other the largest democracy. They have the 
largest populations in the world, economies that are in the global top ten, and growing 
military capabilities supplemented by nuclear weapons. Therefore, understanding the 
factors that enabled cooperation and discord in the mid-20th century could shed light on 
these countries’ current and future outlooks. An evaluation of their current relationship can 
provide valuable direction to policymakers and military officials as they plan strategically 
and operationally for future engagements in the Indo-Pacific region. India is aligned neither 
to the United States nor China, but their future alignment decision is critical to the stability 
of the region, the United States, and the world more broadly. Understanding the factors 
that have contributed to positive and negative developments in Sino-Indian relations can 
have significant implications on how U.S. strategy progresses in its efforts to manage 
China’s rise. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Understanding the relationship that China and India establish is critically important 
to both the region and the United States for three reasons. First, it supports the United 
States’ National Security Strategy, specifically as it pertains to China and its role in the 
Indo-Pacific region. China’s economic, institutional, military, and diplomatic rise has 
altered U.S. policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the most recent 
U.S. National Security Strategy, China threatens to “limit U.S. access to the region and ... 
Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.”2 
The U.S. desires to strengthen its relationships with allies and partners in the region through 
either bilateral or multilateral alliances. Additionally, the U.S. seeks to increase its 
“quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India” to manage China’s rise.3 
                                                 
2 Donald Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 46, 
http://nssarchive.us/. 
3 Trump, 46. 
4 
India’s increasing military and economic power can be essential elements that strengthen 
the U.S. position in the region to balance against China. Furthermore, the U.S. “welcome 
[s] India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense 
partner.”4 Therefore, the United States has refocused its efforts toward the Pacific to 
preserve the current world order, reassure allies, and protect the free flow of trade. 
Second, the Sino-Indian relationship is arguably the most significant bilateral 
relationship in the region. David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee assert that “the two 
rising Asian powers are helping shape a new distribution of global power, as demonstrated 
not just by their growing prominence within the machinery of multilateral economic and 
security diplomacy but by the ardor with which they are courted by other international 
actors.”5 In other words, while China and India are attempting to exert power and 
influence, regional actors are pursuing bilateral relationships with each state that may 
inadvertently lead to increased mistrust and mutual misperceptions concerning strategic 
intent. Indian Prime Minister Modi stresses that “as two major powers in the emerging 
world order, engagement between India and China transcends the bilateral dimension and 
has a significant bearing on regional, multilateral and global issues.”6 A more cooperative 
partnership between India and China represents a clear and present danger to the United 
States and other regional neighbors that may seek to contain China. Regional states may 
find themselves in a precarious position as India and China work through a relationship 
historically characterized by mistrust. A more cooperative Sino-Indian relationship could 
potential reorder the region, fundamentally altering U.S. security alignments in the Indo-
Pacific. 
Third, a conflictual Sino-Indian relationship will certainly lead to instability in the 
region. Border skirmishes that have remained geographically constrained and limited in 
                                                 
4 Trump, 46. 
5 David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52, 
no. 1 (March 2010): 154, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396331003612513. 
6 “Joint Statement between the India and China during Prime Minister’s Visit to China,” Government 




duration may ultimately escalate into high-intensity regional conflict between two nuclear 
states. According to Robert Farley, “a war involving India and the PRC [People’s Republic 
of China] would undoubtedly carry the greatest stakes, threatening to bring not only the 
United States into the fray, but also Pakistan and Russia.”7 Without the appropriate de-
escalatory mechanisms, a high intensity conflict between China and India would 
fundamentally undermine the global economy, resulting in a dramatic reordering of the 
region’s security relationships. Harsh V. Pant asserts that “the future of this Asian Century 
will, to a large extent, depend upon the relationship between these two regional giants, and 
the bilateral relationship between them will define the contours of the new international 
political architecture in Asia and the world at large.”8 Therefore, deciphering issues that 
may impede or empower Sino-Indian cooperation and partnership is paramount to the 
region’s stability. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review consists of two sections, Sino-Indian relations from 1950–
1962 and Sino-Indian relations from 2008 to 2017. Both sections present the prevailing 
scholastic interpretations of the most important factors contributing to cooperation or 
discord in Sino-Indian relations. Scholars contend that western imperial victimization bred 
the desire in both nations to establish a new diplomatic approach to international relations 
characterized by cooperation rather than by conflict. However, scholars argue that 
territorial disputes concerning China and India’s shared border and Prime Minister Nehru’s 
aggressive “Forward Policy” ultimately led to conflict and a deterioration of Sino-Indian 
relations. 
                                                 
7 Robert Farley, “This Is How Bad a U.S.-China War Would Be (In 2030),” National Interest, 
September 5, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-bad-us-china-war-would-be-2030-30532. 
8 Harsh V. Pant, The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 2014), IX. 
6 
1. 1950-1962 Sino-Indian Relations 
a. Early Sino-Indian Diplomatic Cooperation 
Early Sino-Indian relations are best characterized as cooperative strategies that ran 
counter to the international and regional order. As Amardeep Athwal explains, in April of 
1950, “India was the first non-socialist country to establish formal diplomatic relations 
with the PRC.”9 India’s diplomatic recognition of the PRC contradicted the regional as 
well as the, international norms, which favored the Republic of China (ROC). Furthermore, 
India continually advocated for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recognition of 
the PRC over the ROC until 1962. During this period, high-level leadership visits further 
strengthened this burgeoning relationship. 
In June 1954, these visits culminated in the Panchsheel agreement, which 
established the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These principles underscored 
respect for another state’s sovereign territory through non-interference and non-aggression, 
which should yield peaceful coexistence.10 China and India envisioned that these 
principles would underpin the foundation of a new diplomatic approach to international 
relations. Sidhu and Yuan assert that “in many ways, the 1954 agreement paved the way 
for improved relations between the two countries.”11 Ultimately, China and India were 
committed to maintaining a political order that prevented another historical period of 
imperialist control. 
Following the 1954 Panchsheel agreement, China and India presented the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to the countries present at the Bandung Conference, 
which further cemented their relationship and vision for the future. The Bandung 
Conference was held in Indonesia in April of 1955 and was the first ever Afro-Asian 
conference. Han Nianlong contends that the Bandung Conference “represented the 
                                                 
9 Amardeep Athwal, China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics, Routledge Contemporary 
South Asia Series (New York: Routledge, 2009), 20. 
10 “Text of Statement by Chou and Nehru,” New York Times, June 29, 1954, sec. Archives, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1954/06/29/archives/text-of-statement-by-chou-and-nehru.html. 
11 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing Dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 13. 
7 
common struggle of the Asian and African peoples to safeguard their national 
independence, preserve world peace, and promote friendly cooperation and thus served as 
a great impetus to unity and progress.”12 The 1955 Bandung Conference marked the 
pinnacle of Chinese and Indian cooperation and served to support the eventual creation of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. 
The Non-Aligned Movement served as a platform on which those countries that did 
not seek to align with the new bipolar world—communist or capitalist, Soviet Union or the 
United States—could come together under universal principles and peacefully seek their 
own path to success. Itty Abraham asserts that “Non-alignment is most often represented 
as a counter-hegemonic critic of contemporary world order or a rhetorical justification for 
the maximization of national interest.”13 Shri Prakash asserts that “both countries 
sympathized deeply with their respective popular struggles for ending colonialism.”14 At 
the root of these international advancements were Chinese and Indian national interests 
best characterized by the Panchsheel agreement, which emphasized a commitment to 
territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, and equality. India’s espousal of 
nonalignment was critical to its relationship with the non-aligned states and strategically 
positioned India to remain neutral toward the United States and the Soviet Union. China 
and India thus formed a stronger relationship on the common basis of supporting and 
sustaining the principles that gave forth the non-aligned movement. 
b. Territorial Disputes: Sino-Indian Relations in Ruins 
Conflicting interpretations over maps and lines of demarcation dissolved 
cooperation and ultimately led to the 1962 war. Neville Maxwell explains that “the border 
dispute proper surfaced when China publicized the completion of a motorable road across 
                                                 
12 Nianlong Han, ed., Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 1st ed (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 
1990), 660. 
13 Itty Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65,” 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46, no. 2 (April 2008): 195, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14662040801990280. 
14 Shri Prakash, “India - China Relations: A Comparative View of The 1950s and Early 1990s,” India 
Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 52, no. 3 (July 1996): 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/
097492849605200301. 
8 
Aksai Chin, linking Sinkiang with western Tibet.”15 Sino-Indian analysis of the border led 
each state to conclude that the other state was infringing on its sovereignty, specifically 
concerning the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line was established in 1914 during the 
Simla Convention, in which British and Tibetan representatives signed an agreement that 
divided Tibet between China and India. From the Chinese perspective, the McMahon Line 
was categorically considered an illegal device that imperial states used to undermine 
Chinese sovereignty. As Sheikh Mohd Arif has stressed, “China argued that local Tibetan 
authorities had no legal rights to conclude any border treaty with the British.”16 From the 
Indian perspective, the McMahon Line created cartographically sovereign Indian territorial 
borders that, which China actively ignored and violated. Thus, the Tibetan divide is the 
single most critical aspect of friction between China and India, leading to the Tibetan 
revolt. 
In March of 1959, Tibetan separatist revolts targeted Chinese forces that India 
considered to be occupation forces. Chen Jian argues that “from the time the Chinese 
Communists asserted control of Tibet in 1951, profound political, social, and ethnic 
conflict has divided the communist authorities from Tibet’s aristocratic and monastic elites, 
as well as from many ordinary Tibetans.”17 Chinese occupation and the resulting political 
division created the environment that ultimately led to the Tibetan revolt in the spring of 
1959. Xuecheng Liu argues that “the Tibetan rebellion was the catalyst of the existing 
tension in the relations between China and India,”18 which hinged on the legal status of 
Tibet. Liu continues by explaining that “Chinese policy-makers believed that India was 
representing a threat from the imperialist West on the western frontier of China and that 
India was meddling in China’s Tibetan affairs.”19 The status of Tibet put China and India 
                                                 
15 Neville Maxwell, “Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered,” Economic and Political Weekly 34, 
no. 15 (1999): 910. 
16 Sheikh Mohd Arif, “A History of Sino-Indian Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation,” 
International Journal of Political Science and Development 1, no. 4 (December 2013): 131–32. 
17 Jian Chen, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the 
Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 3 (July 31, 2006): 99. 
18 Xuecheng Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1994), 25. 
19 Liu, 25–26. 
9 
on a collision course, as Nehru and Mao were unwilling to adjust territorial policies that 
would inevitably produce conflict. 
In November 1961 Nehru adopted the “Forward Policy,” which, according to 
Andrew Kennedy, was Nehru’s strategy to “increase the pressure on China ... Under this 
approach, India would establish outposts up to, and sometimes beyond, Chinese positions 
in the disputed areas.”20 According to Xuecheng Liu, the genesis of this policy was rooted 
in Nehru’s 1959 policy known as the non-recognition and non-negotiation policy.21 The 
Forward Policy was a strategy that attempted to reassert India’s sovereignty over disputed 
border areas gradually, the objective of which was “to prevent the Chinese advance and ... 
establish the physical presence of Indian troops.”22 However, the policy backfired as China 
responded with its own assertively punitive policy. 
As a result of Nehru’s Forward Policy, China adopted an opposing policy of armed 
coexistence along the border. The Forward Policy was the impetus that would inevitably 
lead to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and fundamentally alter Sino-Indian relations for decades 
to come. John Garver stresses that “The PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] drive to the 
southern foothills of the Himalayas had a profound effect on Indian opinion. China became 
a nemesis of India ranked only after Pakistan. Even forty-some years after the war this 
sentiment remains significant in India.”23 Thus, the Sino-Indian border war marked the 
official deterioration of Sino-Indian relations. 
2. 2008-2017 Sino-Indian Relations 
The following review captures the central scholarly debates concerning the last 
decade of the Sino-Indian relationship. Although the relationship has grown more complex, 
similar factors that plagued the relationship in the mid-20th century continue to linger and 
                                                 
20 Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy 
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damage current Sino-Indian relations, which include border disputes and regional 
competition. Overall, this section highlights how Sino-Indian relations have matured, 
through economic interdependence and joint institution-building, as well as through 
increased diplomatic overtures and military relations. However, this section also reveals 
that unbalanced trade, and competition along the shared border and in the Indian Ocean 
Region remain areas of potential conflict. 
a. Economic Interdependence: Cooperation or Conflict 
Many scholars argue that economic interdependence leads to cooperation. 
According to Bruce Russett and John O’Neal, “countries that are interdependent bilaterally 
or economically open to the global economy, whether democratic or not, have an important 
basis for pacifist relations and conflict resolution.”24 The theory of economic 
interdependence is well established and rooted in qualitative and quantitative data that 
demonstrates the power it has to breed cooperation. China and India engage in a significant 
amount of bilateral trade and participate in a number of multilateral economic forums. 
David Scott notes that China became India’s largest trade partner in 2008, indicating 
increasing levels of economic interdependence.25 A significant element of China’s and 
India’s increasing bilateral trade is the idea of complementary economic goods. Yasheng 
Huang asserts that “China has the hardware and India has the software. One excels in 
manufacturing, the other in service industries.”26 Huang adds that “the 21st century 
belongs to Asia, and the future of Asia belongs to China and India.”27 Economic 
integration is a substantial factor showing quantitatively how these two Asian giants are 
cooperating to reorient the region potentially. Furthermore, China and India have gradually 
found pathways of cooperation, working through multilateral economic forums and 
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institutions. Nilanjan Ghosh and associates assert that “China and India have cooperated 
with each other at the WTO [World Trade Organization] on many issues despite their 
bilateral differences, forming a common south-centric agenda on certain key areas of 
negotiations.”28 China and India have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate their 
resolve concerning critical economic issues that pertain to all of East and South Asia—
essentially acting as a force that speaks up for the entirety of the Indo-Pacific region. 
However, just as economic interdependence has created opportunities for 
cooperation, it has simultaneously aggravated issues of discord due to reciprocal 
misunderstandings, which, in turn, contribute to strategic mistrust. Chietigj Bajpaee 
contends that the “economic imbalance in the bilateral relationship has been a further 
catalyst for mutual misperception between both countries. At present, the Chinese economy 
is almost three times the size of the Indian economy in terms of purchasing power.”29 
Bilateral economic engagement is a critical factor in strong state-to-state relationships, but 
a significant imbalance can fundamentally alter a state’s calculus. Rajesari Rajagopalan 
and Arka Biswas explain that “data from the Indian Ministry of Commerce shows that 
India’s trade deficit with China for FY 2015–16 was estimated to be US$52.7 billion, a 
significant increase from US$1.08 billion in FY 2001–02. A trade imbalance has thus 
resulted in India’s overdependence on China, giving the latter potentially greater 
leverage.”30 Alternatively, Rajagopalan and Biswas assert that “India has implemented 
measures to keep Chinese companies out of the telecommunications infrastructure,” due to 
mounting evidence that indicates that Chinese telecommunication companies may have 
malicious intent.31 Chietigj Bajpaee argues that “while the Sino-Indian relationship has 
improved in recent years, it continues to oscillate between periods of cordiality and 
                                                 
28 Nilanjan Ghosh et al., “China-India Relations in Economic Forums: Examining the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership,” (occasional paper, Observer Research Foundation, August 2018), 
9. 
29 Chietigj Bajpaee, “China-India: Regional Dimensions of the Bilateral Relationship,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2015): 116. 
30 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Arka Biswas, “India–China Relations under Xi Jinping: An Indian 
Perspective,” China: An International Journal 15, no. 1 (February 2017): 121. 
31 Rajagopalan and Biswas, 123. 
12 
competition. This is exacerbated by a fundamental mismatch of threat perceptions between 
both states.”32 In short, the extensive literature argues that despite bilateral trade and 
similar interests in multilateral economic forums, the Sino-India relationship is an 
unbalanced relationship marred by discord and undermined by mutual mistrust. 
b. Institutional Participation: Cooperation or Competition  
Many scholars have noted that institutions act as mechanisms that help build 
cooperation through shared common interests.33 There are three primary institutions that 
scholars point to that are indicative of Sino-Indian cooperation: Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and BRICS.34 
However, a counterpoint to this cooperation is their competition within the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Each of these 
organizations is representative of the different institutional factors that lead China and India 
to cooperate or compete. Bilateral cooperation on security and trade that deepens the Sino-
Indian relationship should, in turn, result in long-term benefits, increasing trust and 
improving mutual perceptions. Despite recent progress in the SCO, AIIB, and BRICS, 
competition in the international and regional domain have undercut confidence-building 
measures that support cooperation. 
In the last decade, the two most prominent instances of Sino-Indian institutional 
competition are China’s decision to block India from joining the NSG and India’s bid for 
a permanent seat on the UNSC. Saira Bano describes the NSG as a “multinational body 
that aims to prevent nuclear exports for peaceful purposes from being used to make nuclear 
weapons.”35 China’s continued efforts to block India’s accession into NSG in the face of 
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international support is evidence of institutional competition that undermines bilateral 
cooperation. Rajagopalan and Biswas emphasize that allowing India in the NSG, “would 
mean acceptance of India as a peer—a notion which Beijing has traditionally remained 
uncomfortable with.”36 The UNSC is one of six components of the United Nations and is 
responsible for the preservation of international peace and security, as well as peacekeeping 
and sanctioning. Charalampos Efstathopoulos points out, “with the exception of China, the 
permanent members of the UNSC all declare their support for India’s candidacy.”37 India’s 
bid for great power status hinges on acceptance into international institutions such as these, 
and China’s continued efforts to subvert India’s acceptance negatively impacts potential 
cooperation in the long-term. 
Despite China’s refusals, India’s emergence as the largest democracy and a top-
performing economy is mostly considered by the global community reason enough to 
accept India into the UNSC and NSG. Some argue that the Sino-Pakistani relationship and 
India’s deepening ties with Japan have influenced China’s strategic positioning on India. 
Umbreen Javaid asserts that “Pakistan and China’s time-tested friendly and strategic ties 
also help to contain Indian influence.”38 Additionally, Vinya Kaura argues that another 
factor driving China “is India’s solidarity with Japan, China’s arch rival.”39 China’s 
strategic positioning on India’s bid for a permanent seat demonstrates the strategic mistrust 
and breakdown of cooperation between the two states.  
c. Confidence-Building Measures: Military Cooperation, Diplomatic 
Exchanges, and Border Agreements 
China and India have engaged in confidence-building measures (CBMs) to increase 
bilateral cooperation since 1993, following the signing of the Border Peace and Tranquility 
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Agreement (BPTA). According to the literature, there are two essential elements. As Manoj 
Joshi asserts, the BPTA first “sought to promote peace through specific modes of conduct 
of the two-armed forces. Second, it called for a reduction—on both sides—of the forces 
and deployments to a ‘minimum level,’ based on the principle ‘mutual and equal 
security.’”40 The agreement was subsequently revisited in 1996, 2005, and 2006 with the 
intent of reducing arms and personnel along the border, standardizing operating procedures 
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and conducting joint military exercises. At the 
heart of CBMs are the military-to-military cooperation; however, CBMs have expanded to 
include diplomatic and civil elements. 
The establishment of Special Representatives and cultural exchange programs mark 
a significant step toward conflict resolution. Chietigj Bajpaee contends that “the propensity 
for misunderstanding is ... fueled by limited people-to-people contacts, cultural barriers, 
and rising levels of nationalism that accompany the growing international clout of both 
countries.”41 Therefore, the annual Special Representatives meetings and cultural 
exchange programs demonstrate a willingness to establish interpersonal relationships that 
can promote stronger Sino-Indian cooperation. Harsh Pant asserts that “bilateral-political 
as well as socio-cultural exchanges are at an all-time high.”42 In 2015, Prime Minister 
Modi and Premier Li agreed to add an additional Consulate General in each other’s country. 
Furthermore, both sides believe that the India-China Cultural Exchange initiative has 
increased mutual trust and cooperation.  
Under the umbrella of CBMs, in 2013, China and India agreed on the Border 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), which brought the two sides together under an 
accepted framework that could mitigate the risk of future border conflicts. Manoj Joshi 
states that “this agreement reiterated the previous agreements and enhanced the interactions 
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of the military operations departments and the defense ministries.”43 Furthermore, during 
the 2018 Wuhan Summit, China and India’s leadership reiterated similar verbiage from the 
BDCA by stating that they desire “peace and tranquility along the India-China border.”44 
The BDCA and the more recent Wuhan Summit both affirm China’s and India’s intent to 
peacefully coexist and form long-term bonds of cooperation. 
d. Confidence-Building Measures: Unable to Bridge the Gap 
On the other hand, China’s naval modernization has created widespread fear within 
the Indo-Pacific region and growing concern among India’s military and policymakers. 
Rajagopalan and Biswas state that “for India, Chinese naval expansion rings warning bells 
as China has rapidly increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.”45 The broad 
consensus is that China’s overseas military basing projects correlating to the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) as well as its support for Pakistan undergird India’s concern. As a result of 
Indian fears, Katherine Morton asserts that “India is tilting towards stronger defense 
cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia in a bid to counter the buildup of 
Chinese military activities in the Indian Ocean.”46 The quadrilateral alliance was agreed 
to in 2007, but dissolved after a year. However, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
published a recent article contending that “China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea 
... and China’s growing influence through the BRI in its neighborhood” has reinvigorated 
efforts to rebuild the quadrilateral security agreement.47 Ivan Lidarev asserts that “Beijing 
has opposed the Quad as a potential anti-Chinese alliance of democracies aimed at 
containing it and checking its maritime rise in the Indo-Pacific.”48 China’s continued rise 
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and naval modernization and India’s participation in the resurgent Quad will inevitably 
produce conflict that undermines cooperation and partnership. 
For all the cooperation achieved as result of special representatives and cultural 
exchanges, Sino-Indian diplomatic relations have deteriorated as China has grown 
increasingly close with Pakistan and employed subversive visa procedures that challenge 
Indian territorial sovereignty. Harsh Pant and Pushan Das stress that the “China-Pakistan 
‘axis’ has always been a source of greater consternation for New Delhi. This nexus between 
Islamabad and Beijing has only grown stronger in recent years.”49 This relationship 
directly contributes to strategic mistrust and undermines CBMs. Furthermore, China has 
opted for a coercive diplomatic mechanism that uses visas as a tool to impose territorial 
claims. China denied visas from Arunachal Pradesh and modified the visas of applicants 
from Jammu and Kashmir. Rajagopalan and Biswas argue that this behavior is viewed “as 
Beijing’s policy of asserting its sovereignty and challenging India’s territorial integrity.”50 
The actions of China in regard to Pakistan and visas frustrate diplomatic efforts and create 
further mistrust and discord in the complicated Sino-Indian relationship.  
Territorial disputes and sovereignty challenges continue to weaken the foundation 
of Sino-Indian cooperation. In 2013, 2014, and, most recently, in 2017, China and India 
have had stand-offs along their shared border. Abhijit Singh explains that China utilizes 
psychological warfare tactics to coerce regional states to capitulate territory and anything 
else China deems a core interest.51 Frank O’Donnell asserts that, in turn, these activities 
“propel India’s growing defense collaboration with the United States and Japan.”52 
However, in order to combat China’s perceived aggression, India pursued a strategy 2017 
that attempted to block strategic road construction in Bhutan that ultimately resulted in the 
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74-day Doklam standoff. The Doklam border standoff is a micro issue that represents a 
larger conflict concerning territory and sovereignty. Joshi asserts that “the border issue can 
poison the bilateral relationship ... and render the relationship building efforts 
ineffectual.”53 Moreover, India’s support of Tibet undermines Chinese sovereignty and 
territorial claims. Joshi explains that “the Tibetan uprising on the eve of the Olympic 
Games in Beijing in 2008 convinced China that India remained a threat.”54 In short, these 
issues of territory and sovereignty remain deeply entrenched in the psyche of New Delhi 
and Beijing elite, and may be the most influential factors hindering cooperation between 
these two Asian giants.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1: Sino-Indian discord is a result of unresolved territorial disputes, 
which is the predominant factor that destabilizes the Sino-Indian relationship. The Sino-
Indian Border war of 1962 and numerous standoffs over the last decade, including Depsang 
in 2013, Chumar in 2014, and, most recently, Doklam in 2017, all serve as a reminder of 
the significant divide that exists between China and India. Regardless of the attempt to 
build a framework of peaceful coexistence, China and India, like any other states, are 
concerned about threats to territorial sovereignty. This concern is magnified by their recent 
history of being colonized by Western states. Thus, China and India are unwilling and 
ideologically disinclined to relent on the issue of border demarcation and, as such, 
confidence-building measures and diplomatic overtures are unable to address the systemic 
issue within the strategic relationship. Evidence of militarization along their shared border 
is a clear indicator of potential conflict. Furthermore, assertive new policies, from either 
side, regarding Tibet, Aksai Chin, and Arunachal Pradesh may lead each side to another 
clash. 
Hypothesis 2: Conflicting interpretations of India’s relationship with the West and 
China’s relationship with Pakistan have led each side to enact divergent foreign policy 
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agendas that undermine cooperation and partnership. From India’s 1961 Forward Policy to 
the recent resurgence of the Quadrilateral Alliance, China perceives India’s actions as 
strategies to contain, limit, or deter Chinese expansion in the region. Meanwhile, India 
views China’s partnership with Pakistan and China’s expanding economic influence as 
coercive elements that run counter to India’s geostrategic interests and challenge India’s 
emergence as a great power. Therefore, opposing perceptions, cemented by historical 
legacies and amplified by mistrust, serve only to ensure that neither will fundamentally 
accept a more cooperative relationship than is currently the status quo. Evidence of any 
increase in U.S.-Indian relations or Sino-Pakistani relations concerning diplomatic, 
military, economic, and institutional arrangements could lead to further mistrust and agitate 
historical legacies, leading to deeper conflict.  
Hypothesis 3. Continued economic interdependence can create an environment that 
produces cooperation and a stronger partnership. Trade liberalization between China and 
India could be the single most important factor that suppresses conflict, thus enabling a 
more cooperative environment. As a result of complementary markets, trade between the 
two countries has steadily increased. China and India participate in a number of bilateral 
and multilateral economic forums, which reveals shared common interests and may 
decrease the likelihood of conflict. China and India are the two largest states in the Indo-
Pacific region and play critical roles in the World Trade Organization (WTO), BRICS, and 
other institutions, which can help overcome historical legacies that have hindered Sino-
Indian relations in the past. Therefore, economic interdependence has the seeds to produce 
cooperation despite systemic differences. Evidence of decreasing the trade imbalance and 
lifting any trade tariffs could concede an increase in cooperation. If China or India increases 
Foreign Direct Investment, it could potentially signify a deepening of cooperative relations. 
Furthermore, growth in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which could 
include India signing onto the Belt and Road Initiative, would demonstrate a clear path to 
future long-term cooperation. 
Hypothesis 4. Evidence indicates that confidence building measures focused on the 
inclusivity of regional institutions, integrated military exercises, and cultural/diplomatic 
exchanges have helped improve these two Asian giants’ relations during the first two 
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decades of the 21st century. Chinese-led institutions such as the SCO and AIIB, which both 
include India, demonstrate that both have similar interests and visions for security and 
economics in the region. Furthermore, joint military exercises broaden Chinese and Indian 
cooperation, which has displayed increased levels of trust and compatibility on the 
battlefield. Additionally, the cultural exchanges can assist in shedding light on the rich 
ancient history that China and India share, which captures the roots of their cooperation. 
Ultimately, as China and India continue to work toward better diplomatic, institutional, 
cultural, and military relations, it increases the probability that they can overcome their 
differences and work together to regain their perceived status as great powers in the 
international world order. Evidence of increased dialogue, face-to-face meetings, and new 
policy agreements pertaining to the established confidence-building measures will 
demonstrate increased cooperation. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is organized to analyze the military, diplomatic, economic, and 
institutional factors that have led to cooperation and discord in the Sino-Indian relationship. 
Due to the globalized nature of the world, states are more interconnected through 
diplomatic, economic, institutional, and military forums where cooperation or competition 
can exist. Thus, analyzing the Sino-Indian relationship through these aspects best captures 
the complexity of the relationship and can shed light on those factors that are most likely 
to define the relationship. The critical first step in this thesis is to provide a historical 
analysis of the relationship following the establishment of their official governments from 
1950 and the ensuing breakdown in 1962. Understanding what factors led to the rise and 
fall of the relationship in the 1950s aids the analysis of Sino-Indian relations from the onset 
of the 21st century to 2017. 
This research is designed to add to the existing scholarly literature concerning Sino-
Indian relations, which project to be extremely important to the 21st century as they are the 
rising powers in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this study employs evidence drawn from a 
qualitative analysis of scholarly literature, as well as from open source reporting from 
Chinese and Indian elites, politicians, military leaders, and business magnates. This thesis 
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also relies heavily on government-produced material by the Chinese and Indians, as well 
as media accounts that offer particular insights into the actions of both governments. The 
qualitative analysis examines Sino-Indian relations across the spectrum of political, 
economic, military, and institutional competition and cooperation. 
E. OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II is an examination of the diplomatic, institutional, and military 
parameters that China and India pursued in the earliest stages of their bilateral relationship 
that compelled cooperation but ended in conflict. This chapter emphasizes the success of 
Sino-Indian cooperation in regard to the Panchsheel Agreement and the Bandung 
Conference, juxtaposed against the failure of border policy that culminated in the Sino-
Indian Border War of 1962. Critical to the chapter is the identification of those elements 
that may be present in today’s increasingly complex Sino-Indian relationship. These 
identified factors are used to develop a framework for the subsequent chapter.  
Chapter III is an examination of Sino-Indian relations from 2008–2017 which each 
state has experienced unprecedented economic growth and rapidly expanding spheres of 
influence. As a result of the confluence of economic and military expansion, Sino-Indian 
relations are strained by the increasing weight to shoulder a more significant share of 
regional responsibility. As these two Asian giants struggle to find their footing in an era of 
great power competition, the issues of bilateral cooperation have taken center stage. 
Chapter III assesses specifically a decade of Sino-Indian relations that are ever more 
complex, mature and deep, in an attempt to forecast whether long-term cooperation is 
realistic. The chapter analyzes critical areas in which the Chinese and Indians have found 
avenues of cooperation but, due to mutual mistrust, are unable to maintain those gains. The 
determination for long-term sustainable cooperation is based on the factors identified in 
Chapter II that resulted in failed Sino-Indian relations. 
Chapter IV concludes the thesis research. The chapter offers the main findings of 
the research and briefly discusses the significance and implications for the bilateral, 
regional, and international domains. In short, Sino-Indian relations will be the center of 
political discourse for decades to come. 
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II. THE MAKING AND DESTROYING OF HINDI CHINI BHAI 
BHAI SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS 1950–1962  
China and India have enjoyed a rich history that dates back to the first and second 
millennia, when both civilizations ruled East and South Asia. During that time, China’s 
and India’s positions as centers of the region alternated back and forth. Over the course of 
this time, China and India established a cooperative, complementary, and cordial 
relationship predicated on shared religion, scientific learning, culture, and traded goods. 
However, as time progressed and the world grew more interconnected through the process 
of industrialization, China’s and India’s positions in the world dramatically changed. China 
and India suffered at the hands of European powers: India became a colony of Britain, 
while China was controlled by unequal treaties imposed by Western powers and ravaged 
by Japan. Throughout this shared experience, China’s and India’s bilateral relationship did 
not dramatically change; instead, they maintained similar visions for the future, which 
hinged on gaining independence and, eventually, reestablishing their greatness within the 
region and the world more broadly. 
This chapter explores China’s and India’s independence and establishment of their 
official governments and analyzes the complex relationship from Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai, a 
Hindu phrase championed by Nehru meaning ‘China and India are brothers,’ highlighting 
a spirit of strong comradery that drastically shifted, resulting in the 1962 border war. The 
first section analyzes China’s and India’s relationship that led to the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence, focusing on the factors that fostered and led to cooperation between 
China and India from 1950–1955. These factors include a legacy of common struggle at 
the hands of Western imperialism; common pressures due to the advent of the bipolar 
world; and common regional and global security concerns, which culminated in the historic 
Bandung Conference. The second section examines issues that resulted in competition and 
hostility between China and India from 1956–1959. These issues include competition for 
regional influence and unresolved territorial claims. The final section assesses the enduring 
rivalry between China and India concerning unresolved territorial disputes, exacerbated by 
domestic and international factors, which contributed to the 1962 border war. Overall, this 
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chapter finds that although Sino-Indian relations in this period appeared promising, the 
relationship was fragile at best, highlighting that territorial sovereignty and divergent 
national interests proved too much to overcome. 
A. THE BIRTH OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 1950–1955 
There are three factors that characterize early Sino-Indian cooperation: Western 
imperialism, the advent of the bipolar world, and similar regional and global security 
concerns. Following World War II and its aftermath—the disintegration of empires and 
decolonization—India and China envisioned a new world where they could reestablish 
their greatness, absent of Western influence. John Garver asserts that “the [Republic of 
India] and the [People’s Republic of China] felt a strong sense of mission toward the 
developing countries. Both felt, with considerable justice, that their own national struggles 
had played an extremely important role in bringing about the collapse of colonialism.”55 
Furthermore, Garver highlights that “these common anti-imperialist and anti-Western 
sentiments were a key basis of the period of Chinese-Indian solidarity in the mid-1950s.”56 
Additionally, Sheikh Arif asserts that “[Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru greeted the birth 
of communist China in October with great pomp,” demonstrating the optimism emanating 
from India that the future of Asia was bright.57 This period is commonly referred to as 
Hindi, Chini, Bhai Bhai, which translates to ‘India and China are brothers.’58 Waheguru 
Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan stress that this was a period “marked by euphoria and 
cordiality, [during which] the territorial claims were largely overlooked as the two 
countries were preoccupied with global and regional issues bearing on their security.”59 
Therefore, despite differences in government systems—democracy vs. socialism—and 
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ideologies—liberalism vs. communism—and contradictory territorial claims, India and 
China found common ground, leading to significant bilateral relations. 
The first signs of cooperation occurred in 1950 when India engaged in foreign 
policy strategies that ran counter to the international and regional order. In 1950, official 
diplomatic relations between the newly established governments of Beijing and New Delhi 
hinged on the potential for both to influence the region and the world more broadly. 
Amardeep Athwal explains that in April of 1950, “India was the first non-socialist country 
to establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC [People’s Republic of China].”60 
Within the UNSC the majority of the members did not recognize the PRC as the 
government to China, instead favoring the Republic of China. India’s position on the matter 
represents a stark contrast to international consensus, demonstrating a strong inclination by 
India toward the PRC. Although India was quick to establish relations with China, China 
was hesitant and questioned India’s overall motives. Sidhu and Yuan explain that “Mao 
was less than forthcoming; Beijing initially referred to the Indian government as a puppet 
of imperialism and an obstacle to movements for national liberation.”61 However, India’s 
continual advocacy for United Nations Security Council recognition of the PRC over the 
ROC, demonstrated to the PRC that India was more aligned with anti-imperialist rhetoric 
than initially perceived.62 Additionally, Xuecheng Liu asserts that “in terms of the interests 
of Chinese strategic security, India played a mediating role during the Korean War, 
advocated China’s representation in the United Nations and supported China on the 
question of integration of Taiwan with the mainland.”63 Thus, India’s support for the PRC 
ran counter to the regional and international norms, which favored the ROC.64 
The second step toward increased cooperation occurred as a result of the newly 
established bipolar international order; India, more so than China, was put in a precarious 
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situation—align with either the United States or the Soviet Union. For China, aligning with 
the Soviet Union was a remarkably easy choice given its commitment to communism. 
However, India’s decision was not as clear. Indian leadership weighed the costs of aligning 
to either side, focusing on what would best support its national narrative amid the aftermath 
of the partition of British India, and on who would provide the most robust security 
partnership as tensions with Pakistan continued to rise. Sumit Ganguly argues that “from 
the Indian perspective, the major powers, particularly the United Kingdom and the United 
States, adopted a decidedly pro-Pakistani stance in the Security Council proceedings,” 
forcing India to lean on its own state capacity and on China as it sought to establish its 
national narrative, hegemonic objectives, and secure its newly defined borders.65 
Additionally, Ashok Kaur argues that “the [U.S.] decision to form a military pact in 1954 
with Pakistan was the end of an evenhanded policy,” completely shifting in favor of 
Pakistan.66 Although, at this time, all signs pointed to India aligning itself to anti-western 
ideals, India instead sought to establish a third pathway for prosperity that other Asian 
countries could follow.67 Jeff Smith emphasizes that “[New] Delhi was determined to 
remain above the political and ideological conflicts of the Cold War,” and thus remain as 
neutral as possible.68 Furthermore, Bruce Riedal argues that “Nehru concluded ... that India 
stay neutral in the cold war and seek to build friendly ties with China.”69 Therefore, India 
chose to work closely with China in order to establish a stronger security partner and carry 
out its national and international ambitions. Ultimately, Sino-Indian cooperation would 
provide the region with greater stability and give China and India greater leverage 
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geopolitically. According to John Garver, Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy agenda was 
multilayered: 
During the 1950s a key dimension of India’s effort at Asian leadership was 
toward the PRC itself. As the perceptive Pakistani diplomat Mohammed 
Yanus pointed out, Nehru’s desire to establish Indian leadership during 
these years enhanced the value of friendship with China. For Nehru, 
bringing the PRC into the international system in spite of American 
objections was a key component of his effort at Asian leadership.70  
Therefore, China and India maintained high-level exchanges to assist in establishing a 
cooperative relationship that would increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation within 
the region. 
Ultimately, cooperation was reinforced due to regional security concerns: namely, 
the threat India perceived from Pakistan following independence and partition along its 
Western border. Fostering a bilateral relationship with China enabled India to remain 
focused on the threat of Pakistan, who was gaining military parity due to international and 
Western support. As a consequence of Sino-Indian cooperation, territorial threats 
emanating from the Eastern border were largely mitigated. Liu asserts that “Pakistan’s 
military alliance with the United States and its membership of the CENTO [Central Treaty 
Organization] and the SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization] sponsored by the 
West, concerned Indian policymakers, and constituted a grave threat to India’s national 
security.”71 Furthermore, Kapur stresses that one of the themes of the United States’ India-
Pakistan policy was that “Indian domestic policies revealed imperialist traits which if 
unchecked could make India a successor to Japan’s Asiatic imperialism.”72 Additionally, 
Garver notes that India’s policies in the region created fear and required India to take 
measures to assuage regional concerns.73 Therefore, in order to overcome the U.S.-U.K.-
Pakistan nexus, Liu argues that “Indian policymakers saw friendship with China as the best 
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guarantee for security.”74 Mohan Malik echoes a similar notion, describing that “since the 
days of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India has entertained hopes of a 
joint Sino-Indian leadership of Asia as a counter to Western influence.”75 Thus, India 
strategically viewed China as a security partner and an important ally that could assist in 
influencing the region.76 
From the perspective of China, Beijing saw cooperation and friendship with India 
as a counterweight to the West and as a mechanism for the exportation of the Communist 
revolution. Chen Jian stresses there was a “division of labor between the Chinese and 
Soviet Communists for waging the world revolution ... they decided that while the Soviet 
Union would remain the center of international proletarian revolution, China’s primary 
duty would be the promotion of the Eastern revolution.”77 In other words, Mao and Stalin 
came to an agreement to divide and conquer, forming a strategic and ideological 
partnership enabling both to execute the ultimate goal—the spread of Communism across 
the globe. Although India never declared alignment to either of the major Cold War 
powers, India saw the United States as a political and military threat due to its constant 
support of Pakistan. Therefore, despite declaring a position of nonalignment, India made 
overtures to China and the Soviet Union, aiding them in their grand strategy. Similarly, 
China viewed the U.S. as a political and military threat. For example, China’s experience 
during the Korean War and the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises demonstrated the hard 
stance the United States adopted toward China. According to Chen, “the most profound 
reason underlying the CCP’s [Chinese Communist Party] anti-American policy was Mao’s 
grand plans for transforming China’s state, society and international outlook.”78 Part of 
this plan encompassed conditioning the local populace and then seeking partners abroad to 
share the same disdain for the United States and the Western world more broadly. 
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Therefore, in order for China to achieve its international objectives, partnering with India 
became a valuable political and security arrangement. Thus, a strategic partnership was 
most advantageous to carry out both Chinese and Indian national and international 
interests. 
Overall, these three factors—a legacy of common struggle against Western 
imperialism; common pressures due to the advent of the new bipolar world; and common 
regional and global security concerns—culminated in the Panchsheel Agreement, arguably 
one of the highest points of the Sino-Indian relationship. Signed in June 1954 in New Delhi, 
by Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Panchsheel Agreement 
established, most notably, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, trade and 
intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, and firmly recognized Tibet as a 
sovereign region of China.79 Sidhu and Yuan assert that “in many ways, the 1954 
agreement paved the way for improved relations between the two countries.”80 The Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence consisted of the following: 
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
2. Mutual non-aggression; 
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and 
5. Peaceful coexistence.81 
Although the ideals that undergird the Five Principles are not entirely new, China and India 
envisioned that combining these principles into an agreeable framework would underpin 
the foundation of a robust diplomatic approach to international relations.82 Ultimately, 
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China and India were committed to the maintenance of a political order that prevented 
another historical period of imperialist control.  
Analyzing the terms of the agreement shows that India did not necessarily see the 
agreement as a win-win. Specifically, the Tibetan aspect of the Panchsheel Agreement did 
not settle well for India; however, India lacked the capabilities necessary to prevent China’s 
occupation. Sidhu and Yuan assert that “realizing that the Chinese occupation of Tibet was 
a fait accompli and not having the wherewithal to challenge these developments, Nehru 
eventually acknowledged Tibet as an autonomous region of China under the Panchsheel 
Agreement of 1954.”83 Nonetheless, Nehru cooperated and hoped that, over time, both 
sides could revisit the issue of Tibet and complete a more favorable deal. For China, the 
deal was a win-win; they had tied India’s hands on Tibet and, based on the establishment 
of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, appeared more favorable to the rest of the 
non-aligned states.84 In the long run, tension surrounding Tibet eventually resurfaced as a 
critical flashpoint in Sino-Indian relations. Nevertheless, at this junction in time, Sino-
Indian cooperation neared its peak as the Panchsheel Agreement blossomed into the 
Bandung Conference.  
China and India introduced the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to the 
countries present at the historic Bandung Conference, which further cemented their 
relationship and vision for the future. The Bandung Conference was held in Indonesia in 
April of 1955 and was the first ever Afro-Asian conference. Han Nianlong contends that 
the Bandung Conference “represented the common struggle of the Asian and African 
peoples to safeguard their national independence, preserve world peace, and promote 
friendly cooperation and thus served as a great impetus to unity and progress.”85 For China 
and India, this was an opportunity to jointly lead the newly independent countries under 
their tutelage—through the vehicle of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Garver 
contends that Nehru was driven to include China due to the opportunity to build closer ties 
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with it, show the rest of the newly independent states that China was a credible ally, and to 
put constraints on China via the acknowledgment of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence.86 Han argues that “in attending the Conference, China’s policy was to expand 
the united front of peace, to promote the national independence movement, to create 
conditions for the establishment and enhancement of relations between China and some 
other Asian and African countries, and to make the conference a success.”87 In short, India 
and China shared a common struggle for independence, similar regional and global security 
concerns, and a common vision for the future, which was embraced by the members of the 
conference and exhibited the pinnacle of Chinese and Indian cooperation. However, 
regardless of the high levels of cooperation, there lay dormant issues surrounding 
unresolved territorial claims and competition for regional influence. 
B. SINO-INDIAN COMPETITION AND HOSTILITY 1956–1959 
From 1956 to 1959, Sino-Indian relations transitioned from cooperative to 
competitive and hostile, primarily due to competition for regional influence and unresolved 
territorial claims, which ultimately culminated in the Tibetan rebellion. As early as the 
Bandung conference itself, there was evidence of a growing hostility between China and 
India. Garver argues that the Bandung Conference exposed a deep-seated “rivalry between 
Nehru and Zhou” due to differing interpretations of the proposed future of Africa and 
Asia.88 Nehru argued that the newly established states should align neither with the Soviet 
Union nor with the United States and, instead, stressed that choosing one or the other would 
result in World War III.89 As an alternative, Nehru recommended a policy of 
nonalignment, arguing that this type of policy would be the most advantageous in achieving 
long-term peace.90 However, Nehru’s approach was not well received, and instead, Zhou 
                                                 
86 Garver, Protracted Contest, 118–19. 
87 Han, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 107.  
88 Garver, Protracted Contest, 119.  
89 Garver, 119.  
90 Garver, 119–20.  
30 
won over those in attendance with his diplomacy and humble attitude.91 Zhou stressed that 
the Chinese delegation came to the conference desiring to build Afro-Asian comradery, 
seeking commonality and accepting differences among the states as inherent and not 
something over which to quarrel. Overall, his message emphasized that China would work 
diligently with the Afro-Asian states to preserve the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence.92 David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee explain that “after Bandung, the 
emerging competition between India and China contributed to an increasingly strained 
bilateral relationship.”93 Although the Bandung Conference was an overall success for 
Sino-Indian relations, it also begat competing interests for regional and global influence 
among the newly independent states—nonalignment vs. communism. Nehru espoused 
nonalignment as the governing standard for the developing world, while Mao championed 
a class struggle designed to polarize the situation. Garver stressed that “Mao’s militant line 
[would] soon [bring] China into conflict with India.”94 Following the Bandung 
Conference, the once-promising relationship started to show signs of competition as both 
had vastly different outlooks for the future. 
Sino-Indian relations were further challenged by the early signs of the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1956. The rift between the two communist camps, China and the USSR, had 
significant international effects on China’s relationship with India. China believed that in 
order to compete with the USSR, it needed to shift its political and security relationship 
from India to Pakistan. Ashok Kapur explains that “in the 1950s, Pakistan was attractive 
to China in the context of its global competition with the USSR.”95 Additionally, M.S. 
Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly contend that “in the case of China ... its geo-political stakes in 
preventing India from becoming a major power were so high that it began to perceive a 
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great deal of interest in the ability of Pakistan to act as a check on India.”96 Increased 
China-Pakistan relations pushed India to seek security and economic assistance from the 
USSR. According to Kapur, “the USSR supported India diplomatically at the UN Security 
Council on Kashmir in the 1950s, using its veto often on India’s behalf, and later it helped 
India militarily by giving it valuable and timely military aid and equipment.”97 Therefore, 
as the geo-political landscape shifted in the mid-1950s, it created a competitive and hostile 
relationship between China and India.  
The decisive factor tearing at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship centered on 
unresolved territorial claims dating back to the 1914 Simla Convention that established the 
McMahon Line. Figure 1 highlights the conflict surrounding China and India’s shared 
border. The critical areas to note are north of India and east of Kashmir in an area called 
Aksai-Chin and northeast of India along the blue route demarcating the McMahon Line, 
which encompasses parts of Tibet, Tawang, and Arunachal Pradesh. These highlighted 
zones do not capture every area of disagreement; however, the disputes over these areas 
just discussed, specifically the area closest to Tibet, significantly impacted and altered 
Sino-Indian relations from 1956–1959.  
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Figure 1. Sino-Indian disputed border regions98 
The McMahon Line was established in 1914 during the Simla Convention, in which 
British and Tibetan representatives signed an agreement that divided Tibet between China 
and India. From the Chinese perspective, the McMahon Line was categorically considered 
an illegal device of imperial states to undermine Chinese sovereignty.99 As Arif has 
stressed, “China argued that local Tibetan authorities had no legal rights to conclude any 
border treaty with the British.”100 From the Indian perspective, the McMahon Line created 
cartographically sovereign Indian territory, which China actively ignored and violated, 
resulting in a fundamental divide concerning territory along their shared border.101 In 
1958, China published announcements internationally that it had constructed roads 
connecting Sinkiang with western Tibet that were fully traversable by automobile.102 Sino-
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Indian analysis of the border led each state to conclude that the other state was infringing 
on its sovereignty, specifically concerning the McMahon Line, creating a perceived 
security threat. Thus, the unresolved territorial claims encapsulate the most critical aspects 
of friction between China and India.  
Indian and Chinese policy concerning Tibet and the territory it occupied created 
ambiguity and escalated tension between the two. Rajiv Sikri stresses that “it was evident 
that the steps being taken by China to tighten its grip on Tibet led it to occupy and claim 
territory that India also claimed.”103 Beijing considered Tibet a part of China proper; 
therefore, any meddling by India posed a dangerous threat to China’s national security. 
Contrarily, New Delhi considered Tibet to be a part of its strategic nationalist narrative and 
state security apparatus.104 Moreover, New Delhi viewed China’s military, economic, and 
political build-up in Tibet as a danger to India’s national security.105 However, Prime 
Minister Nehru, knowing India was not materially capable of challenging China, desired 
to play mediator to the dispute, which served to undermine Sino-Indian relations.106 Mao 
did not see Nehru’s actions as neutral, but rather caused China to question India’s 
objectives regarding its territorial integrity. Nehru’s actions were considered duplicitous in 
nature, increasing tension between the two states. 
Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Zhou opened dialogue concerning the issues of 
their shared border and Tibet in hopes of striking a win-win deal. After Nehru and the 
Indian government recognized Tibet as an autonomous region of China and signed the 
Panchsheel agreement in 1954, India expected that their goodwill would soon lead to a 
definitive border agreement.107 However, as the years went on and talks continued to stall, 
Nehru grew unhappy that the Chinese government had not revisited these issues. China 
countered and Zhou denounced the McMahon Line, stating that “the Sino-Indian boundary 
                                                 
103 Rajiv Sirki, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 
(Spring/Summer 2011): 61. 
104 Garver, Protracted Contest, 39. 
105 Garver, 32. 
106 Smith, Cold Peace, 91. 
107 Sidhu and Yuan, China and India, 13. 
34 
has never been formally delimited.”108 As tension continued to rise and grow worse, 
neither side was willing to compromise on the parameters of their shared border. The 
resulting stalemate compelled Nehru to adopt a strict policy of Non-Recognition and Non-
Negotiation.109 In other words, India no longer recognized Tibet as an autonomous region 
of China and would no longer negotiate until China accepted the parameters outlined by 
the McMahon Line, ultimately increasing tensions between Beijing and New Delhi—
further damaging the fragile relationship. The proceeding diplomatic failures resulted in 
the 1959 Tibetan separatist revolt against Chinese control. 
The 1959 Tibetan rebellion is the critical flashpoint capturing the serious nature of 
the territorial issue between China and India. Liu asserts that “the Tibetan rebellion was 
the catalyst of the existing tensions in the relations between China and India.”110 The 
rebellion erupted on 10 March and lasted approximately one month until the CCP cracked 
down and suppressed it, leading to nearly 90,000 Tibetan deaths and over 80,000 refugees 
who fled to India, including the Dalai Lama.111 Although many argue that the incident was 
a local dispute over who would govern Tibet—Tibet traditionalists or CCP appointed 
officials—the rebellion was a critical factor between India and China regarding unresolved 
territory and their competing desire to exercise sovereignty and influence over Tibet. Malik 
emphasizes that “Tibet lies at the heart of China-India relations. It is the key to 
understanding Beijing’s stance on the China-India territorial dispute.”112 Furthermore, he 
stresses that “the eruption of the 1959 rebellion in Tibet soured relations and culminated in 
the 1962 War.”113 Overall, this conflict is marked by strategic distrust and marred by 
differing historical interpretations over maps and lines of demarcation, which foreshadow 
the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.  
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C. INTENSE RIVALRY AND A STRUGGLE FOR TERRITORY 1960–1962 
From 1960–1962, Sino-Indian relations wholly unraveled. The two Asian giants—
motivated by territorial sovereignty and domestic and international pressures—
implemented assertive policies that brought them to war along their shared border in 1962, 
marking the end of Hindi, Chini, Bhai Bhai and creating their own cold war. 
The issues of territorial sovereignty surrounding the Tibetan rebellion created more 
profound Sino-Indian discord. Following the Tibetan Rebellion and China’s successful 
suppression of it, Zhou and Nehru gathered compromise over their shared border; however, 
neither could agree on a win-win compromise. Sidhu and Yuan state that “in a last ditch 
effort to get the border talks back on track, Nehru and Zhou met in New Delhi from 19–25 
April 1960. However, the deadlock continued as neither side was willing to budge from its 
position.”114 Furthermore, Andrew Kennedy argues that “in the course of the talks, Zhou 
essentially offered to trade China’s claims in the east for Indian concession in the west. 
Nehru, however, was unwilling to make such a deal.”115 In short, the issues of territorial 
sovereignty grew to encapsulate Sino-Indian relations, dividing China and India and 
defining their relationship for decades to come. 
Additionally, domestic factors in China and India contributed to growing 
dissonance. Scholars argue that Nehru and Mao felt immense domestic pressures that led 
to assertive foreign policy agendas. Kennedy argues that “[Nehru] was under great pressure 
domestically to respond forcefully to what was seen as a Chinese intrusion on Indian 
territory.”116 Garver goes further and explains that “criticism of Nehru’s policy of 
befriending and placating China began to mount,” forcing him to take a more adversarial 
approach to Chinese assertive actions in Tibet and near the McMahon Line.117 Chen argues 
that “because of the domestic mobilization function Mao attached to China’s external 
policies ... Beijing’s leaders resorted to force only when the confrontation was in one way 
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or another related to China’s territorial integrity and physical security.”118 Garver adds 
that China was faced with multiple domestic threats emanating notably from Chiang Kai-
Shek in Taiwan and the failing domestic policy known as the Great Leap Forward.119 The 
domestic threats fomented Mao’s calculus for mobilization focused on countering 
perceived threats to territory and national integrity. Overall, the domestic pressure on 
China’s and India’s governments encouraged aggressive actions and instigated further 
conflict.  
In conjunction with the changing domestic landscape, international factors 
amplified the growing division in Sino-Indian relations. According to Garver, China was 
dealing with the notion that the United States and India were working together to support 
Tibet’s bid for autonomy.120 Furthermore, due to the Sino-Soviet split, China felt 
increasingly isolated given the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to support China’s more 
aggressive policy, instead preferring that China submit to India’s demands.121 According 
to Sidhu and Yuan, Mao did not receive the support he was expecting from the Soviet 
Union, highlighting that “the Soviet Union denounced China’s approach as an expression 
of a narrow nationalist attitude and tilted in favor of India, arguing that it was unthinkable 
for a military and economically weaker India to launch such a military attack against 
China.”122 India also made efforts to internationalize the struggle for the Tibetans, fueling 
an aggressive response by Mao and the PRC.123 Mao perceived that China’s borders were 
threatened along all sides, requiring a strong stance to defend China’s territory from the 
likes of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, and the Soviet Union. Thus, the pressure 
mounted against China and India; war was nearing.  
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International factors, such as the Sino-Pakistani relationship influenced India’s 
assertive policies as it planned for a potential two-front war. Therefore, as time passed, 
India enacted policies to secure its borders against what became its most dangerous threat, 
China. Thus, Nehru implemented the Forward Policy, arguably the single most important 
policy that led to the Sino-Indian Border War. The Forward Policy was a strategy that 
attempted to gradually reassert India’s sovereignty over disputed border areas; the 
objective was “to prevent the Chinese advance and ... establish the physical presence of 
Indian troops.”124 According to Kennedy, Nehru’s Forward Policy was designed to 
“increase the pressure on China ... Under this approach, India would establish outposts up 
to, and sometimes beyond, Chinese positions in the disputed areas.”125 Garver asserts that 
“Nehru concluded that the time was right for action ... the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet 
alliance and China’s domestic crisis convinced Nehru that the situation was advantageous 
to India.”126 However, the Forward Policy backfired as China responded with its assertive 
policy designed to reprimand India for violating Chinese sovereignty. 
After numerous rounds of failed diplomatic talks, China adopted an adversarial 
policy of armed coexistence along the border. China responded to India’s Forward Policy 
by launching a military campaign in October of 1962 that decimated India’s forces.127 
India was surprised by the response from China, having assumed that China did not have 
the means or will to conduct a counterattack. China’s counterattack left Nehru and his 
government defeated and humiliated.128 Garver stresses that “The PLA’s drive to the 
southern foothills of the Himalayas had a profound effect on Indian opinion. China became 
a nemesis of India ranked only after Pakistan. Even forty-some years after the war this 
sentiment remains significant in India.”129 Thus, the Sino-Indian border war marked the 
official unraveling of Sino-Indian relations and the end of Chini Hindi Bhai Bhai. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
From 1950–1962, Sino-Indian relations are best categorized as a mixture of 
cooperation and competition. From 1950–1955, after establishing their official 
governments, China and India took several steps toward cooperation hinging on three 
factors: similar historical legacies imposed on both states by Western imperialism; similar 
regional and global security concerns; and similar pressures created by the bipolar 
international system. All three factors led China and India to work together as evidenced 
by the Panchsheel Agreement and the Bandung Conference. However, from 1956–1959, 
following the Bandung Conference, the relationship started to spiral out of control due to 
competing national and regional interests and issues surrounding unresolved territorial 
claims, which led to the 1959 Tibetan rebellion—a catalyst encapsulating Sino-Indian 
tensions. From 1960–1962, these factors compounded and grew worse as China and India 
faced mounting pressure domestically and internationally—increasing the concern over 
territorial sovereignty. The Sino-Indian relationship completely soured when war broke out 
in October of 1962. The Chinese demonstrated their superiority, leaving the Indians 
humiliated and threatened not only by Pakistan to its East but now also by an assertive 
China to its West. The result of the war severed all early efforts for joint leadership in Asia 
and ushered in dueling narratives for Asian hegemony. In short, this chapter has 
demonstrated that early Sino-Indian relationships proved to be promising as both desired 
to work together to usher in a new international system antithetical to the bipolar system. 
However, these notions collapsed as China and India could not overcome their competing 
interests in the region and the deep-seated issue concerning territorial integrity. 
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III. A QUEST FOR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS 2008–2017  
After three decades of dysfunctional Sino-Indian relations, the two states began the 
process of rebuilding friendship early in the 21st century. This process involved creating 
confidence-building measures designed to increase diplomatic, institutional, cultural, 
military, and economic transparency in an attempt to overcome historical legacies and build 
a new era of Sino-Indian cooperation. Within the scope of international relations, radical 
structural changes have occurred that have created reverberations throughout the world, 
complicating state-to-state relations. These changes include the global war on terrorism, 
the global financial crisis, and a shift towards great power competition, and they have 
deepened, broadened, and complicated Sino-Indian relations. In the second decade of the 
21st century, the relationship was once again strained by the complexities imposed by each 
state’s interpretation of territorial sovereignty and desire for resources and influence in the 
Indo-Pacific region. In short, structural changes have not only created new avenues for 
cooperation but also renewed competition and conflict as China and India jockey for power 
and influence in the region. 
This chapter begins in the early 2000s following China’s and India’s remarkable 
economic development and growth, analyzing their multifaceted relationship from 
strategic cooperation to strategic competition. It analyzes the evolution of Sino-Indian 
relations from 2008–2017, dividing this period into three blocks, demonstrating the 
progression from cooperation to competition and conflict. The first section analyzes the 
relationship from 2008–2011, highlighting the growth in confidence-building measures, 
trade, and security relations. The second section analyzes the relationship from 2012–2015, 
emphasizing China’s and India’s robust military modernization and transition from 
pragmatic to assertive leadership, culminating in renewed tensions over territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. The last section analyzes the relationship from 2016–2017, focusing on 
the Doklam Standoff, the most protracted border dispute since the 1962 Sino-Indian border 
war, which punctuates a new era of strained relations. Overall, this chapter finds that, 
despite unprecedented economic growth and global integration, Sino-Indian bilateral 
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relations remain marred by territorial sovereignty issues and “competition for resources 
and influence in the [Indo-Pacific] region.” 130 
A. A SHARED VISION: 2008–2011 
There are three factors that characterized Sino-Indian cooperation in the early 
2000s. One, the threat of terrorism within their borders and throughout the region prompted 
both states to create a common framework to combat this common security threat. Two, 
both states desired to maintain and expand their development and growth. Lastly, President 
Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took a pragmatic approach to bilateral and 
global relations, openly building mechanisms and creating consensus for better Sino-Indian 
relations. 
1. Security and Military Cooperation 
From 2008–2011, Sino-Indian security and military relations can primarily be 
characterized as cooperative. However, the most noteworthy flare-up in Sino-Indian 
security and military relations occurred as a result of growing U.S.-Indian relations in the 
nuclear realm. The U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Agreement prompted China to question 
India’s strategic security and military aspirations, but, despite this instance of conflict, 
overall Sino-Indian security and military relations took on new levels of cooperation. The 
underlying factor leading to closer Sino-Indian security and military relations was the rise 
of terrorism and the necessity for both states to build a multinational Asian security 
apparatus designed to preserve peace and stability in the Asia Pacific.  
a. Fighting the Threat of Terrorism Together 
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the 
international community was stunned, fundamentally altering how states defend against 
the threat of terrorism. Shen Dingli argues that “the 9/11 attacks have transformed the 
world political landscape ... the anti-terror issues [have] been increasingly part of the new 
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Sino-Indian security relationship.”131 Following the 9/11 attacks, China and India 
supported the political and military aim of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, mainly 
converging with the rest of the world on the necessity to destroy these terror cells. 
However, neither state supported the U.S. response to these attacks, questioning the 
justification—that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction—to preemptively attack 
Iraq. Therefore, at a global level, China and India converged on the political and military 
aims of combatting terrorism. 
Concerning terrorism in the immediate surroundings of China and India, both states 
opened dialogue about combatting the growing threat terrorism posed to their national 
security and the Indo-Pacific region more broadly.132 Joshi explains that China and India 
expanded CBMs in 2006, signing “an MoU [Memorandum of Understanding]—the first 
ever between the two defense ministries—calling for high level military exchanges, joint 
exercises, counterterrorism and anti-piracy cooperation.”133 Beginning in 2007, China and 
India launched their first joint anti-terror training evolution in southwest China, called 
Hand-in-Hand 2007.134 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated that “the 
training aimed to strengthen the two countries’ exchanges in the field of anti-terrorism ... 
and promote the development of the bilateral strategic partnership.”135 Since 2007, China 
and India have made this exercise an annual military and security training evolution, 
creating a new era of closer Sino-Indian security and military relations. 
b. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Commonality under an Asian 
Security Apparatus 
Additionally, China and India are engaged in a newly established Asian security 
organization predicated on counterterrorism. This organization is known as the Shanghai 
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Cooperation Organization and evolved from the Shanghai Five in 2001.136 The SCO is led 
by China and encompasses five member states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Russia—and four observer states—Iran, Mongolia, India, and Pakistan.137 
The role of the SCO is multi-faceted, encompassing not only security but also political and 
economic motivations; however, it is primarily a security organization. Jyotsna Bakshi 
explains that the primary role of the SCO is a “joint struggle against separatism, extremism, 
and terrorism.”138 Overall, the SCO demonstrates another mechanism showing increased 
Sino-Indian cooperation concerning regional security. 
2. Economic Cooperation 
A second step toward greater Sino-Indian cooperation occurred as a result of 
unprecedented economic development and growth. Many scholars argue that economic 
interdependence leads to cooperation. According to Bruce Russett and John O’Neal, 
avoiding conflict and maintaining peace are equally important pursuits for any countries, 
regardless of governing style, that depend on bilateral relations or the global economy.139 
It is important to note that while bilateral trade between these two countries has reached 
new heights, Beijing’s economic projects along the periphery of India have the potential to 
challenge overall Sino-Indian economic relations. However, despite competing interests, 
both states have made it clear that they desire to maintain and expand their economic 
development and growth. Therefore, economic interdependence has brought China and 
India closer than arguably any point since both states gained independence in the 1950s. 
a. Extraordinary Bilateral Trade Relations 
China and India have engaged in an extraordinary level of economic coordination 
consisting of a significant amount of bilateral trade and investment. According to Gillian 
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Goh and Hui Lynn, “the first fruits of the recent Sino-Indian rapprochement are most 
evident, and naturally so, in the gargantuan growth in bilateral trade.”140 According to 
Jing-dong Yuan, a critical element of the remarkable increase in economic trade began in 
2006 when President Hu Jintao visited India, “the first such visit by a Chinese head of state 
in a decade, marking an important milestone in the bilateral relationship.”141 The key 
takeaway from Hu’s visit to India was that both governments signed a number of 
agreements designed to strengthen cooperation across the trade, investment, energy, and 
educational sectors.142 From that point on, bilateral trade rapidly increased, punctuated by 
China becoming India’s largest trade partner in 2008, surpassing U.S.-India trade in 
value.143 Overall, Sino-Indian bilateral trade has increased from 13.6 billion USD in 2004 
to approximately 62 billion USD in 2010, reflecting the success of the initiatives 
championed by both state leaders.144 
Economic relations culminated in 2011 when both states established a formal 
strategic economic dialogue. Teshu Singh emphasizes that, following Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s visit to India, it was decided that to address trade issues and further strengthen 
bilateral economic relations, “a regular bilateral strategic economic dialogue mechanism 
will be established between the two countries.”145 The strategic economic dialogue was 
designed to increase coordination on large-scale economic policies and facilitate a 
mechanism that China and India could utilize to increase overall economic 
development.146 The establishment of this strategic dialogue emphasizes the importance 
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of uninterrupted bilateral trade for both economies and demonstrates that China and India 
are willing to work through issues of discord for long-term economic benefits. 
b. Multilateral Economic Institutions Are Redefining Sino-Indian 
Cooperation 
From 2008–2011, both states found themselves leading several multilateral 
economic forums such as BRICS and the World Trade Organization. BRICS is comprises 
the original four emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China—and, later, South 
Africa.147 Chietigj Bajpaee emphasizes that the “BRICS forum [has] emerged as a key 
platform for India and China to deepen regional economic integration.”148 The creation of 
BRICS highlights a critical evolution in Sino-Indian relations and serves as potential 
leverage that they can utilize to address other issues outside of economics. China and India 
are also leveraging the WTO to facilitate a more inclusive global economic structure. 
Charalampos Efstathopoulos emphasizes the role India was assuming regarding shaping 
and influencing economic coordination: 
The onset of the global financial crisis at the end of 2008 provided a new 
opportunity to India to act as a system shaper, especially after it became a 
member of the G-20 leaders’ summit. India began to take diplomatic 
initiatives to help overcome the DDA [Doha Development Agenda] 
deadlock, hosting the first post-crisis WTO meeting in New Delhi in 2009, 
and submitting several comprehensive proposals that aimed at 
strengthening the WTO.149  
Overall, Sino-Indian economic integration through massive bilateral trade and increasing 
leadership roles in multilateral economic forums demonstrates quantitatively how these 
two Asian giants were cooperating to reorient the region. 
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3. Political and Diplomatic Cooperation 
The third element of greater Sino-Indian cooperation occurred in the political and 
diplomatic spheres, underscored by pragmatic leadership and converging interests in 
international institutions. It is important to note that this period was not immune 
problematic politics and diplomacy. For example, both states frustrated one another in 
regard to territorial sovereignty: China began issuing visas to Indians in the contested 
territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh, and India arguably fueled the 
Tibetan uprising during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Nonetheless, Sino-Indian relations 
generally increased, converging along major political and diplomatic agreements on 
regional and international topics. 
a. Pragmatic Leadership 
The dynamics of both states’ leaders, Manmohan Singh and Hu Jintao, played a 
significant role in creating and propelling new and existing policies that punctuated a new 
era of Sino-Indian cooperation, giving rise to notions of an Asian century. Singh and Hu 
desired to build upon established norms, while also piloting innovative mechanisms to 
reconcile differences and build cooperation to reorient the region. In 2005, New Delhi and 
Beijing declared a strategic partnership centered on mechanisms to instill peace and 
prosperity.150 Zhang Li states that “the nature of the partnership ... is to avoid 
confrontation, cultivate friendship, and intensify economic interaction.”151 In 2006, 
following President Hu’s historic meeting with Prime Minister Singh, Hu proposed a ten-
point strategy designed to deepen bilateral relations.152 The details of the proposed strategy 
focused on expanding economic ties, building institutional linkages, instilling mutual trust, 
settling outstanding issues, and increasing all-around mutually beneficial cooperation.153 
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The two governments then met in Beijing in 2008 and reiterated their “resolve to promote 
the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity through 
developing the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for peace and prosperity between the 
two countries.”154 In 2010, both sides officially agreed to the ten-point strategy, marking 
a new era of political and diplomatic cooperation. 
b. Institutional Consensus Driving Greater Cooperation 
At a broader level, the leaders of China and India have converged on many global 
issues revealing a robust approach toward increased cooperation and trust. Both 
governments’ approaches to global topics demonstrate that China and India desire to revise 
the western-leaning global governance structure through institutional consensus. Shen 
argues that “the China-India rapprochement amounts to sharing a common view of a fair 
world order accommodating multipolarity in the international system.”155 China and India 
began coordinating on worldwide issues, such as global governance, international trade, 
collective security arrangements, and climate change, hoping to further their aims of 
creating a more equitable global system.156 China’s and India’s actions convey an 
understanding that reshaping the Bretton-Woods global governance system is complex and 
requires sustained cooperation and multilateralism.157 
Both states have integrated into global institutions, such as the WTO, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the UNSC, to push an agenda that better suits the 
majority of the world. Sino-Indian efforts to shape a more inclusive WTO began as early 
as 2001 during the Doha round of negotiations, and in 2003 when both states formed the 
G-20.158 China and India led the charge by advocating on behalf of the developing world 
on issues concerning the current agriculture trading rules and regulations, which favor the 
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developed states while hurting the developing states.159 In terms of international financial 
institutions, China and India desire a more significant stake in voting and quota shares of 
institutions such as IMF and World Bank.160 
In terms of UN focused security arrangements, China and India often frame their 
policy decisions based on non-interference and non-violence, typically at odds with the 
West. Additionally, concerning the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC), both states oppose issues relating to carbon emissions caps, arguing that 
caps on carbon emissions hinder their collective ability to fulfill their national development 
strategies. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting records also indicate that 
China and India align more often than not, demonstrating that their “positions coincide 
with the collective interests of the developing nations.”161 Overall, China and India find 
that the Western-led global governance system mostly favors the United States and 
prevents their full-fledged rise to great power status, ultimately leading China and India to 
forge a stronger relationship. 
B. COMPREHENSIVE COMPETITION FOR REGIONAL INFLUENCE: 
2012–2015 
Following a short period of cooperation, Sino-Indian relations quickly diverged 
into a competition over regional influence. The essential elements highlighting the second 
decade of the 21st-century Sino-Indian relationship center on their dueling military 
modernization programs, competing economic development strategies, and assertive new 
leadership.  
1. Security and Military Competition: A Battle for Regional Hegemony 
From 2012–2015, Sino-Indian security and military relations transitioned from 
cooperative and cordial to competitive and contentious due to both states’ perception of the 
other. Keshab Ratha and Sushanta Mahapatra argue that “China and India are locked in a 
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classic security dilemma: one country sees its actions as defensive, but the same actions 
appear aggressive to the other.”162 Pant concurs, stating that “the Sino-Indian strategic 
relationship is rapidly evolving and tensions are building up.”163 The underlying factors 
leading to the strain of security and military relations are both states’ military 
modernization programs and increased tension along their contested border. 
a. Chinese Naval Modernization: A Rising Great Power  
China’s military modernization has been taking place since the early 1990s, but 
over the last decade, its military modernization has experienced tremendous results, 
fundamentally reshaping the perception that the rest of the region and the world have 
toward its rise. Two Indian scholars of note, Harsh Pant and Das Pushan argue that 
“China’s growing naval capability has resulted in an impression that Beijing not only seeks 
primacy in near seas but naval dominance in far flung areas.”164 It is important to note that 
the two catalysts for China’s motivation to modernize its military and navy were the 1991 
Gulf War and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Robert Ross and Jo Bekkevold note that the 
1991 Gulf War, where the United States demonstrated robust military capabilities with its 
allies to defeat Saddam Hussein, convinced China that it needed to rebuild its military.165 
Michael Green adds that the third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 reiterated China’s need to 
modernize its navy specifically.166 These events drove China’s policymakers to acquire a 
large and capable military force that could bolster China’s status in the Indo-Pacific and 
prepare it for 21st-century warfare. 
In 2012, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) became the largest navy in 
the Indo-Pacific. Michael Green states that the PLAN possesses “approximately 60 
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destroyers and frigates, 35 submarines, 51 amphibious ships, and 67 missile-equipped 
small combatants in its East and South Sea Fleets alone.”167 Pant explains that “China’s 
economic transformation has given it the capability to emerge as a major military power as 
it continues to announce double-digit increases in its military spending.”168 Over the last 
two decades, China’s military expenditures have rapidly increased. The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China’s defense spending 
from 2012–2015 began at $157 billion USD and increased to $214 billion USD by 2015.169 
China spends its defense dollars on three categories: (1) training and military exercises, (2) 
purchasing and repairing weapons, and (3) acquiring new military equipment and 
technology.170 Overall, the PLA naval, air, ground, and rocket forces have developed into 
a world-class military with far-reaching capabilities that rival those of the United States, 
which has created widespread concern in the region. 
b. Indian Naval Modernization: A Direct Response to China 
Although Pakistan is a significant security threat to India, China is the most critical 
threat to India’s bid for great power status in the Indo-Pacific region.171 Thus, Pant 
contends that “the real challenge for India, however, lies in China’s rise as a military 
power.”172 China’s robust naval modernization has stoked fear of containment among 
Indians, ultimately propelling India to rebuild its military and naval program. Rajesh 
Rajagopalan explains that “China’s military power and its proclivity to use military force—
as most recently illustrated in the South China Sea—represent a serious threat [to 
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India].”173 Thus, China’s increasing number of maritime deployments and its belligerency 
in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean are concerning among Indian 
elites and accelerating India’s military modernization process. 
India is modernizing its military, engaging with like-minded partners, and 
increasing its nuclear capacity to compete with and challenge China’s growing footprint in 
the Indo-Pacific. Pant stresses that in response to China, India has begun “a process of 
military consolidation and build-up of key external partnerships.”174 In 2012, following 
India’s purchase of a Russian nuclear submarine, it became the sixth state to possess and 
operate a nuclear-powered submarine, increasing India’s naval capacity.175 The 
acquisition of a submarine-based nuclear arsenal is instrumental in India’s intent to have a 
credible second-strike capability.176 Richard Bitzinger explains that “India is in the midst 
of upgrading its navy, acquiring several large surface combatants—including at least two 
and possibly three aircraft carriers—and over a dozen new submarines (both nuclear-and 
conventionally powered).”177 According to Lt. Gen. S.L. Narasimhan (RETD), India now 
“has seven army commands, three naval commands, four air force commands and two tri 
service commands.”178 Although India’s military modernization is still lagging behind 
China’s, India is utilizing additional methods to balance China’s advantage. 
India is not only boosting up its defenses internally, but it is building it is taking 
external steps to bolster its defenses by engaging with compatible partners in pseudo 
coalitions designed to level the playing field with China. S. Paul Kapur and Diana Wueger 
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emphasize that “India has sought closer cooperation with like-minded countries such as 
Japan and Vietnam to coordinate regional military capabilities and responses that could 
offset rising Chinese power.”179 Pant asserts that India’s “Look East Policy, originally 
aimed at strengthening economic ties with its Southeast Asian neighbors, has now led to 
naval exercises with Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia.”180 Additionally, India is more 
closely affiliating with the United States, Japan, and Australia in an effort to build strong 
defense cooperation to counter China’s increasing military role in the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR).181 However, the most important partner for India is the United States, and vice 
versa.182 Overall, India’s increasingly close ties with the United States and other regional 
players highlight the growing continuity among these states and underscores their 
collective efforts to maintain the status quo. 
In the nuclear realm, India and China exercise the capability and wherewithal to 
utilize nuclear weapons as a last resort. Nuclear weapons are a critical aspect of Sino-Indian 
relations. Kapur and Wueger state that 
nuclear weapons have an important role to play in Sino-Indian security 
relations. They provide India the final measure of protection against a rising 
adversary that is engaged in increasingly competitive regional behavior, and 
with which India has a fraught history. Nuclear weapons cannot solve all of 
India’s China-related strategic problems ... but they do provide a layer of 
protection that will prevent China from threatening Indian survival or 
sovereignty.183 
Although nuclear weapons do not necessarily prevent war, they make the risk calculus 
more complex, imposing higher costs on both sides. Therefore, despite the asymmetry in 
Sino-Indian capabilities, China must consider the costs of its military deployments in the 
Indian Ocean. 
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c. Border Tension: Escalation and Standoffs 
Sino-Indian border tensions consistently undermine efforts to increase bilateral 
cooperation. Bajpaee contends that “at the root of mutual mistrust is the unresolved border 
dispute, which remains a thorn in the bilateral relationship.”184 Although both states 
continue to meet regularly, through mechanisms such as special representatives, their 
efforts have yielded no border resolution. Bajpaee argues “that China and India are hybrid 
powers—that is, both are established continental and emerging maritime powers—add 
[ing] to the complexity of the relationship and creat [ing] the potential for horizontal 
escalation.”185 This escalation manifested in two highly publicized border disputes. The 
first took place in 2013 in Depsang and the second took place in Chumar in 2014. 
China’s and India’s actions along the border led to a three-week standoff in 
Depsang as both sides accused the other of violating its sovereign territory.186 Similarly, 
in 2014 China and India engaged in another border standoff in Chumar, accusing each other 
of violating the 2005 border protocol by attempting to build infrastructure in the contested 
area.187 China’s and India’s military modernization has exacerbated border tensions as 
both sides have increased their presence and posture along the Line of Actual Control. 
Bajpaee indicates that “both countries’ expanding military capabilities have served to deter 
the outbreak of an all-out war, [but] this has also fueled the proclivity for limited stand-
offs along their contested border.”188 Pant emphasizes that “China’s rapid expansion and 
modernization of its transport infrastructure across the border is forcing India to 
respond.”189 The responses from both sides escalated into two major border standoffs, 
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highlighting that compartmentalized border issues continue to bedevil efforts of 
cooperation. 
2. Economic Competition: An Increasing Trade Deficit and Dueling 
Economic Development Strategies 
Despite Sino-Indian coordination within economic institutions such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS Development Bank, their economic 
relationship is best characterized as an ongoing struggle for regional influence. This 
struggle is highlighted by a growing trade imbalance and competing economic 
development strategies, and a battle for energy resources. Ratha and Mahapatra argue that 
“the competition over resources (oil, gas and water), overseas markets and bases, external 
overlapping spheres of influence, rival alliance relationships and ever-widening 
geopolitical horizons limit the chances of genuine Sino-Indian accommodation.”190 In 
short, from 2012–2015, Sino-Indian economic relations plummeted as competing interests 
converged and both sides were unwilling to compromise. 
a. Trade Imbalance 
Sino-Indian bilateral trade has continued to soar to new heights, reaching 
approximately $70 billion USD, but the growing imbalance in their trade is a critical strain 
on progressive economic relations. Despite growing Sino-Indian bilateral trade numbers 
and the conventional wisdom that deepening economic interdependence preserves 
cooperation, the opposite is occurring in Sino-Indian economic relations. Under the surface 
of these large bilateral trade numbers is a growing Indian trade deficit that reached $48 
billion USD in 2015, roughly 3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).191 Moreover, in 
2015 India’s total exports were $276 billion and its total imports were $369 billion, 
meaning India had a $93 billion trade deficit. That same year India exported $12 billion to 
China and imported $59 billion from China, roughly a $48 billion trade deficit with China. 
The nature of this trade imbalance poses a considerable problem for increased 
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cooperation.192 Rajeswari Rajagopalan and Arka Biswas argue that “a trade imbalance has 
thus resulted in India’s overdependence on China giving the latter potentially greater 
leverage.”193 Figure 2 highlights the steady increase in the trade imbalance. Although 
China and India are engaged in unprecedented levels of trade, the trade imbalance reveals 
an underlying issue that has long-term effects that can lead to negative Sino-Indian 
relations. 
 
Figure 2. China’s exports to India and India’s exports to China, USD 
billions.194 
b. The OBOR Initiative: The Cornerstone of China’s Policy  
Although the trade imbalance is important, the more critical aspect of the growing 
Sino-Indian conundrum centers on their dueling economic development strategies. Pant 
stresses that “Beijing’s means, both economic and military, to pursue its goals are greater 
than at any time in the recent past.”195 China’s critical foreign policy program, known as 
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the One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR),196 was introduced by President Xi in 2013 and 
has garnered widespread attention for its true motivations, multi-faceted goals, its long-
term feasibility, and scale. Hong Yu highlights that “the Chinese government’s OBOR 
strategy forms a cornerstone of its new foreign policy.”197 The OBOR is comprised of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt 
focuses on building infrastructure to connect the mainland of China to Central Asia and 
Europe.198 The Maritime Silk Road focuses on building port facilities along Southeast, 
South and North Asia to secure its sea lines of communication and valuable resources.199 
Ratha and Mahapatra explain that “the road connects with the belt through a series of 
corridors between new ports on the littoral and new trade routes in inner Asia.”200 Overall, 
China’s OBOR highlights its rise and punctuates a new era of competition for influence 
and resources. 
c. Necklace of Diamonds and the Connect Central Asia Policies: An 
Indian Response to China’s Ambitious OBOR  
India views Xi’s ambitious economic policy as a new, but very similar, version of 
the String of Pearls strategy, which aimed at containing India. Pant argues that “the real 
concern for India, however, is the number of projects that China has undertaken in these 
areas.”201 To counter China, India is developing multiple strategies that hinge on 
revamping its military under policies such as Look East and Make in India, leveraging 
regional partners and building closer ties with the United States. However, in order to 
specifically compete with China’s economic policy, India first responded with its own form 
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of the String of Pearls known as the Necklace of Diamonds.202 This strategy was designed 
to extend its maritime and economic reach to gain access to vital ports and make inroads 
with its neighbors.203 Additionally, India has recently developed a complementary venture 
known as Connect Central Asia. The strategy was launched in 2012 and is designed to 
build roads, rails, and energy pipelines that cross through the subcontinent, ultimately 
linking India to its Central Asian partners.204 Chaudhury explains that 
a great game is unfolding in resource-rich, but landlocked, Central Asia, 
where China through its one-belt-one-road (OBOR) [sic] initiative is 
attempting to harness maximum mineral and hydrocarbon wealth as well as 
grow the market for its goods. India, not to be left behind, has also embarked 
on a Connect Central Asia policy, trying to overcome a disadvantage it has: 
lack of direct connectivity to the region.205 
Overall, China and India are economically competing to acquire a larger footprint 
in the Indo-Pacific region and dueling to safeguard their maritime trade routes and vital 
resources. The common thread tying these issues together points back to issues of territorial 
sovereignty. India argues that China’s OBOR infringes on its territorial sovereignty and its 
natural sphere of influence. Aspects of the OBOR, such as the China-Pakistan economic 
corridor, cross through the highly contested Pakistani and Indian territory of Kashmir. 
Additionally, OBOR projects near the 1962 border drives India to question China’s overall 
motivations and intentions in the region.206 However, China makes historical claims to its 
initiatives to justify its new policies. The contention builds as India lays claim to central 
Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, asserting that it has a natural right to this geostrategic 
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area. Therefore, China’s efforts to expand into central Asia and the Indian Ocean Region 
directly challenge India’s sphere of influence. 
3. Political Competition: New Leaders with Grand Strategies 
Apart from economics, the contention manifests in the political sphere as China and 
India engage in competing foreign policy agendas driven by nationalism and institutional 
rivalry. Thomas Christensen contends that part of the reason Asia has become an arena for 
rivalry is due to “China’s return to great power status [making it] perhaps the most 
important challenge in [the] twenty-first-century.”207 Ratha and Mahapatra argue that “the 
seeds of confrontation are inherent between the two nations engaged in competition, at both 
the regional and global level.”208 In short, the underlying factors influencing the shift from 
political cooperation to political rivalry are new assertive leadership driven by nationalistic 
narratives and an ever-growing competition within global institutions.  
a. Assertive New Leadership 
Xi Jinping’s and Narendra Modi’s rise to power has ushered in a new era of 
assertive foreign policy agendas. In 2012, the PRC embarked on a leadership transition 
from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, who quickly consolidated power and made sweeping 
domestic and foreign policy changes. To jumpstart his presidency, Xi Jinping raised the 
notion of the “Chinese Dream,” describing its characteristics as “making continued efforts 
to achieve the great renewal of the Chinese nation, make the Chinese nation stand rock-
firm in the family of nations, and make even greater contributions to mankind.”209 Yu 
contends that “compared with his predecessors, Xi has abandoned China’s long-held policy 
of keeping a low profile in international affairs’ [sic] adhered to since the 1980s by the 
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previous leader Deng Xiaoping.” 210 He adds that “China’s foreign policy is now more 
centralized, proactive and even aggressive.”211 Xi Jinping has made it apparent, through 
increased land reclamation in the South China Sea (SCS) and increased deployments in 
and around the Indo-Pacific region, that China’s maritime territory and sovereignty are 
critical to its grand strategy of becoming a global power. Yu states that “Xi views the 
change to China’s foreign policy as necessary to match its ascendancy as the rising global 
power. Xi intends that China will one day become a rule-shaper in the global arena and 
regain a position of pre-eminence in the world.”212 Ultimately, China desires to shape a 
world order antithetical to Western values, fundamentally altering the current status quo 
not only in the region but in the world more broadly. 
As China reshapes its regional policies, it is also working within international 
institutions to prevent other actors, such as India, from challenging its position. For 
example, Xi is aggressively working within global institutions to stymie India’s ascension. 
Ratha and Mahapatra argue that “China has clearly shown its hand against India, by 
working against the latter’s entry as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.”213 
Most notably, out of the five permanent member states wielding veto power, China has yet 
to extend its full-fledged support for India’s request for permanent member status.214 
Additionally, India has applied for membership within the Nuclear Suppliers Group but 
China has voted to prevent India’s membership status. The main reason China continuously 
votes this way is to prevent India from achieving great power status. Ultimately, China’s 
strategic positioning concerning India’s role within institutions comes down to China’s aim 
of becoming the unequivocal regional hegemon in Asia and eventually of the world.  
Part of India’s response to China’s growing belligerency was the election of its own 
hard-nosed leader, Narendra Modi. In 2014, India elected Narendra Modi, a more 
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conservative and nationalist figure from the Bharatiya Janata Party. The first instance of a 
stronger Indian stance toward China came during the 2014 Chumar border standoff. Kanti 
Bajpai argues that Modi “was prepared to be more aggressive militarily ... [and] the 
confrontation gave Modi the opportunity to complain about the Chinese behavior and to 
shift the terms of India-China interactions over the border dispute by means of public 
demarche.”215 Pant stresses that “Indian policy trajectory toward China is evolving as 
India starts to pursue a policy of internal and external balancing more forcefully in an 
attempt to protect its core interests.”216 Therefore, at the heart of Modi’s policy toward 
China is a deliberate push for a quick resolution to the border issue and securing a coalition 
to counter China’s growing assertiveness in the IOR. 
Overall, both leaders have taken strong stances against the others’ policies, which 
have been driven by nationalistic fervor. Yu argues that “China’s proactive foreign policy 
has been influenced by the increasing sense of national pride that has accompanied the 
emergence of China as a global power and the world’s second largest economy.”217 
Similarly, Pant contends that “China’s recent hardening toward India might well be a 
function of its own internal vulnerabilities, but that is hardly a consolation to Indian 
policymakers who have to respond to a public that increasingly wants the country to assert 
itself in the region and beyond.”218 Therefore, the two largest states in the world are 
emerging as global powers, both vying for influence in the Indo-Pacific. 
C. BORDER TENSION IGNITES HOSTILITIES IN DOKLAM: 2016–2017 
The competition quickly turned hostile and culminated in the Doklam border 
standoff, the most protracted border standoff since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. 
According to Frank O’Donnell, “the Doklam standoff between Chinese and Indian troops 
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in the summer of 2017 coincided with an ongoing deterioration in bilateral relations and 
accelerated preexisting security dilemma dynamics.”219 The standoff represents three 
underlying issues that have strained and continue to strain Sino-Indian relations: competing 
economic and military programs, which have created a growing security dilemma; 
nationalistic and assertive new leadership driving both sides to adopt more aggressive 
foreign policy agendas; and, the most important crippling factor, their unresolved territorial 
dispute. 
1. Doklam Standoff: A New Era of Strained Bilateral Relations 
The Doklam standoff is a multilayered issue spanning the scope of security, 
economics, and politics. O’Donnell explains that the “Doklam episode occurred against a 
backdrop of gradual modernizations of military forces and logistical networks along the 
Sino-Indian border that have affected the two countries’ perceptions of the other.”220 The 
border standoff started in June 2017 in a disputed area between China and Bhutan and 
lasted until late August 2017. The dispute centered on China’s efforts to build a road near 
the China-India-Bhutan tri-junction, which would have arguably given China a strategic 
foothold into India’s neighborhood. Therefore, Modi took an aggressive approach toward 
perceived Chinese aggression and ordered the Indian army to block and prevent China’s 
construction and its troop movement. The hard-nosed approach brought the two largest 
nuclear-capable states toe-to-toe, resulting in a 74-day border standoff—the longest such 
standoff since the 1962 border war. According to Ivan Lidarev, 
[there are] two important issues. One is China-India competition for 
influence in Bhutan, which reflects the wider competition for influence in 
South Asia prompted by China’s growing power in the region and India’s 
desire to protect what it sees as its own sphere of interest. The other is the 
unresolved and increasingly unstable China-India territorial dispute, which 
has seen growing militarization in recent years, a destabilizing completion 
to build infrastructure around the de facto border, and frequent incidents 
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including in 2013 and 2014. Both issues indicate the tightening of the 
China-India security dilemma.221 
Bajpai argues that India’s actions are a direct reflection of the shifting security 
environment, competition for economic influence, and Modi’s more aggressive stance 
toward China.222 China’s and India’s behavior along the border indicate frustration 
regarding the ineffectiveness of both sides’ abilities to come to a favorable agreement 
regarding unresolved territory. Additionally, both states’ actions highlight the nationalistic 
rhetoric emanating from their polarizing leaders. Overall, although the Doklam standoff 
highlights the complexities inherent in the 21st century, the heart of the issue lies in the 
fact that China and India have been unable to come to a mutually acceptable border 
agreement. Ultimately, the Doklam standoff punctuates a new era of strained bilateral 
relations.  
D. CONCLUSION 
After decades of mutual dysfunctional and mutual distrust between China and 
India, their relationship shifted toward cooperation following radical structural changes 
such as the global war on terrorism and the global financial crisis. Despite minor problems 
surrounding visa issues and Chinese aspirations to conduct economic projects in Central 
Asia, early 21st -century Sino-Indian relations were strong, highlighted by unprecedented 
economic development and bilateral trade. China and India moved to the forefront of many 
economic indices, and their bilateral trade reached nearly $62 billion USD in 2011, 
punctuated by China becoming India’s largest trading partner. Sino-Indian security and 
military relations integrated, and both states worked bilaterally and multilaterally through 
the SCO to combat separatism, extremism, and terrorism. Additionally, China and India 
successfully executed their first joint military exercise in 2007, creating what is now known 
as the annual Hand-in-Hand Sino-Indian military exercise. Sino-Indian political relations 
also expanded through confidence-building measures and pragmatic leadership highlighted 
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by both governments agreeing to the ten-point strategy in 2010. The bilateral and regional 
success of their diplomatic relationship spilled over into international institutions where 
both states worked diligently to create a more equitable global system converging on 
critical global issues such as global governance, international trade, collective security 
arrangements, and climate change. Early 21st -century Sino-Indian relations demonstrated 
all the signs of a renewed Sino-Indian honeymoon reminiscent of the early 1950s. 
However, in the second decade of the 21st century, the honeymoon phase quickly 
shifted toward competition and conflict. The complexities imposed by each states’ 
interpretation of territorial sovereignty and desire for resources and influence in the Indo-
Pacific region spiraled into a security dilemma, as both states built dueling military, 
economic, and political strategies. China and India embarked on military modernization 
programs that were predicated on better defending their national security interests; 
however, as China’s program vastly outpaced India’s it created insecurity and fear within 
the government of India, leading India to expand its military and security arrangements. 
India began working with partners in the region, such as Japan and Australia, and 
international actors, such as the United States, ultimately creating fear in China of a 
containment strategy. Economically, a similar spiral effect was occurring. Sino-Indian 
economic relations began to unravel as India’s trade imbalance with China grew to nearly 
$50 billion USD in 2015, indicating an overreliance on China. 
Additionally, China’s cornerstone foreign policy known as the OBOR threatened 
to impede on what India describes as its sphere of influence—central Asia and the IOR. 
China’s aggressive actions in the East China Sea (ECS) and SCS made India wary of 
China’s momentum into the IOR and central Asia. Politically and diplomatically, new 
leadership also changed Sino-Indian relations. Xi and Modi are proactive, aggressive, and 
nationalistic figures who desire to rejuvenate their status as great powers, fundamentally 
ushering in a competitive dynamic between the two states as they vie for similar resources 
and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Due to both states’ dueling military, economic, 
and political strategies, longstanding border issues resurfaced, highlighting a new era of 
Sino-Indian rivalry. The Doklam standoff in 2017 represents the convergence of interests 
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and a newfound competition and conflict that continue to characterize the Sino-Indian 
relationship. 
In short, this chapter has demonstrated that early 21st -century Sino-Indian relations 
appeared promising given unprecedented economic integration, bilateral and multilateral 
security cooperation, and pragmatic leadership. However, rivalry quickly arose as 
competing military, economic, and political strategies reignited border tensions. 
Competition for power and influence in Central Asia and in the IOR exacerbate the 
growing tension. Unresolved border issues remain an obstacle for cooperation and 
underpin fundamental differences. Overall, China and India are engaged in a classic 
security dilemma with the potential for increased border standoffs that can spill over into 
the IOR as they jockey for power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. 
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IV. SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: A ROCKY WAY AHEAD 
This thesis research focused on Sino-Indian relations, analyzing two distinct 
periods—1950-1962 and 2008–2017—and highlighting the factors that led to cooperation, 
competition, and conflict. The first objective of this thesis research was to understand the 
factors that led to positive and negative Sino-Indian relations from the 1950s until the 
culmination of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. The second objective was to take the 
factors from the 1950s and identify if they were prevalent in the 21st-century Sino-Indian 
relationship. Despite the nuances of the 21st century, Sino-Indian relations from 2008–
2017 followed a similar trajectory and culminated in the 2017 Doklam border standoff—
the longest border standoff since the 1962 border war. Although these two time intervals 
are vastly different, certain factors exist across both periods that cultivated positive and 
negative Sino-Indian relations. The factors that led to cooperation and discord from 1950–
1962 transformed Sino-Indian relations from ‘China and India are brothers’ (Hindi Chini 
Bhai Bhai) to rivalry and war. The 21st-century Sino-Indian relationship is on the cusp of 
a similar trajectory, with the potential to impact the bilateral, regional, and international 
domains significantly. This chapter concludes the research by summarizing the main 
factors that led to cooperation, competition, and conflict during both periods and by briefly 
addressing the implications for future Sino-Indian relations. In short, Sino-Indian relations 
are critical to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region; however, unresolved territorial 
disputes, competition for energy resources, a race for regional influence, and assertive 
leadership have hindered cooperation. These factors will likely continue into the future, 
creating a rocky way ahead for the Indo-Pacific region. 
A. MAIN FINDINGS 
From 1950–1962, Sino-Indian relations were characterized by cooperation, 
competition, and conflict, ultimately drifting from friendship to foe. Three primary factors 
led to cooperation: a legacy of Western imperialism; structural changes, such as cold war 
dynamics; and similar regional and global security concerns that centered on the threat 
imposed by the United States. In 1954, the Panchsheel Agreement was signed, capturing 
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the peak of Sino-Indian relations. The agreement highlights five foundational principles: 
“mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-
aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”223 China and India championed this framework with 
the hope of revamping international relations.  
However, from 1956–1959, Sino-Indian relations shifted from cooperation toward 
competition, setting the tone for an intense rivalry. Two primary factors underscored the 
rivalry: competition for regional influence, which was most evident following the Bandung 
Conference, and unresolved territorial claims highlighted by disagreements over the 
McMahon Line and the status of Tibet. In 1955, China and India championed the 
Panchsheel Agreement to third-world countries at the Bandung Conference; however, the 
conference resulted in open competition between Indian Prime Minister Nehru and China’s 
leader, Mao Zedong, over who would have the more significant influence in the region and 
in the third-world more broadly.224 The rivalry amplified as India became frustrated with 
China’s momentum into perceived Indian territory in the Northeast sector. Additionally, 
the status of Tibet became a point of contention, as China’s actions in Tibet grew 
increasingly assertive, leading to the Tibetan rebellion in 1959. Overall, diplomatic efforts 
to overcome the disagreements failed, and Sino-Indian relations started to unravel. 
From 1960–1962, Sino-Indian relations erupted in open conflict along their shared 
border. Two primary factors led to the Sino-Indian border war: ongoing border issues that 
could not be resolved through diplomatic channels, as neither leader could come to a fair 
compromise, and assertive policy agendas by Nehru and Mao, exemplified by Nehru’s 
Forward Policy and Mao’s response. In 1960, Nehru and China’s second in command, 
Premier Zhou Enlai, met on several occasions to discuss solutions for the contested borders, 
but uncompromising resolve set the stage for aggressive actions by both states.225 Chinese 
policy continued to develop infrastructure projects along the unresolved border, inciting 
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Nehru to take a hard stance against perceived Chinese border violations. Thus, Nehru 
launched the Forward Policy, designed to seize and hold land established as India’s under 
the McMahon line.226 However, in October 1962, China responded by attacking Indian 
soldiers who were inching forward, destroying India’s efforts in less than one month and 
utterly humiliating Nehru.227 The 1962 border war marked the official end of Hindi Chini 
Bhai Bhai and ushered in a contentious adversarial relationship that lasted for nearly 30 
years.  
Following decades of rivalry and competition, China and India embarked on a path 
toward renewed friendship in the early 21st-century. From 2008–2011, Sino-Indian 
relations were largely considered cooperative, influenced by three factors: similar regional 
security threats brought on by the 9/11 attacks; a mutual desire to increase economic 
integration, highlighted by China becoming India’s largest trading partner in 2008; and 
pragmatic leadership focused on increasing confidence-building measures.228 The 
structural changes influenced by the 9/11 attacks led China and India to expand their 
military and security cooperation, culminating in joint anti-terrorism training and marking 
a new level of military-to-military cooperation. Additionally, the leaders of both states 
regularly stressed the importance of stronger relations, championing policies such as the 
Ten-Point Strategy, designed to increase all levels of Sino-Indian relations.229 
Nevertheless, across this time period, the most critical factor lending itself to stronger Sino-
Indian cooperation was the integration of the two economies.  
From 2012–2015, Sino-Indian relations shifted from cooperative to competitive. In 
the second decade of the 21st century, Sino-Indian relations became interlocked in a 
security dilemma influenced by dueling military modernization programs, competing 
economic development strategies, and assertive new leadership. The pace of China’s 
military modernization grew increasingly concerning to the region and, most notably, to 
                                                 
226 Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, 229. 
227 Garver, “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962,” 103–5, 122. 
228 Scott, “Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century,” 260. 
229 “A Ten-Pronged Strategy.” 
68 
India. China’s expansive naval programs have changed the PLAN from a brown-water fleet 
to a blue-water fleet, demonstrating extended capabilities and ambitions. Additionally, 
China’s nuclear capabilities have increased and helped drive India and the United States to 
solidify the U.S.-Civil Nuclear agreement in 2008. Prior to that watershed nuclear deal, 
India responded to Chinese nuclear power with its own nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. 
Thus, India has modernized (and continues to modernize) its military programs as a result 
of growing fear of China’s capabilities and motives. Although India has developed internal 
balancing strategies against China, India has also pursued external balancing mechanisms 
through engaging states such as the United States and Japan to establish potential security 
alliances given China’s growing might.  
On the economic front, China’s industrial and commercial projects along India’s 
periphery caused widespread concern in New Delhi as its elites feared Beijing encroaching 
on its sphere of influence, primarily Central Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. China’s 
cornerstone foreign policy, the OBOR, has not only infringed on India’s sphere of 
influence, but the infrastructure projects connecting Pakistan to China cross the highly 
contested Indo-Pakistani border area of Jammu and Kashmir have reignited territorial 
disputes.230 One factor driving China’s and India’s economic projects is their requirements 
for energy resources to support their vast populations. The finite aspect of energy resources 
and China’s and India’s necessity for and reliance on them have turned energy resources 
into a critical component fueling more rivalry.  
The most critical factor highlighting the competitive environment between China 
and India is their assertive leaders, Modi and Xi. Both leaders have far-reaching objectives 
influenced by nationalist narratives, which have resulted in assertive foreign policy 
agendas that undercut bilateral Sino-Indian relations. The factors that caused rivalry and 
competition in the Sino-Indian relationship led to conflict along their shared border in 
2017. From 2016–2017, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated as a result of unresolved 
territorial disputes dating back to the 1950s and Modi’s and Xi’s aggressive policies. In 
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June 2017, China and India engaged in a border standoff along the Doklam Plateau lasting 
73 days, and even though no shots were fired, this was the most protracted and tense border 
standoff since the 1962 border war. The Doklam standoff punctuates a new era of tense 
Sino-Indian relations. 
Although these periods are vastly different, similar factors demonstrate strong 
correlation for cooperation, competition, and conflict. Overall, during both time intervals, 
it is evident that when China and India share a common security threat—the United States 
in the 1950s and terrorists in the 21st-century—and seek economic integration, cooperation 
increases. Conversely, it is evident that when China and India expand their reach via 
military, economic, institutional, or political means, it creates a security dilemma and 
increases competition between both states. The most critical factors relevant to both periods 
are their unresolved border issues and assertive leadership. Minimizing these two factors 
will increase overall Sino-Indian relations, but the amplified complexity of modern 
international relations will challenge China’s and India’s abilities to build stronger 
relations. 
In sum, over the last decade, China and India have risen to prominence; however, 
China has developed into the stronger of the two. China is widely considered a regional 
power, wielding the ability to alter the geopolitics, geo-economics, and the geo-security in 
the Indo-Pacific region. China’s capabilities, current trajectory, and clearly stated policy 
concerning its future ambitions have caused widespread concern over the future of the 
Indo-Pacific region and the rules-based international system the United States has 
maintained since the end of World War II. According to Robert Blackwill, based on 
China’s stated objectives, it has a clear grand strategy predicated on “the accumulation of 
comprehensive national power,” aiming to transcend any other Asian rival.231 Thus, India 
is concerned with China’s future trajectory in the region, which has strained their bilateral 
relationship. Although India is not yet a regional power, it is striving to become one in the 
near future; but, China appears poised to prevent India’s rise. Ultimately, these two Asian 
                                                 
231 Robert D. Blackwill, “China’s Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace America,” National 
Interest, May 26, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-strategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-
america-16359. 
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giants will need to determine how to coexist as two regional powers with convergent 
interests. If the last 65 years of Sino-Indian relations are predictive of their future 
relationship, it is imperative that both states identify lessons from the past in order to 
improve their future relationship. However, based on China’s clearly articulated objectives, 
India will need to grapple with how to balance working with China, leveraging U.S. 
support, and maintaining its autonomy in the Indo-Pacific region. Not only will India need 
to grapple with this reality, but the United States’ foreign policy in the region may need to 
tread lightly given the potentially global ramifications of instigating either cooperative or 
conflictual Sino-Indian outcomes. Nonetheless, Sino-Indian relations will be the center of 
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